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Abstract 
The development economics literature for smuggling focused on the 
change of economic welfare in the developing countries with waport distortion. 
The conclusion is that there would be ambiguous change of economic welfare in 
those in^porting countries. In contrast, it is quite rare to analyse the intact of 
smuggling on the wel&re of the partner countries which oxport. This is because 
the increase in export volume initiated by smuggling activities should 
theoretically bring an unambiguous welfare improvement for the exporting 
countries. Hong Kong is a small open economy and mainly engages in the export 
and re-export business for China# and other foreign countries. Serious smuggling 
activities develop between Hong Kong and China in the 1990s and the change of 
economic welfare of Hong Kong is not unambigious as suggested by the theory. 
The increase of export volume brought about by smuggling into China may bred 
organised crime in Hong Kong. Whetlier this is the case depends on the form of 
smuggling. 
In this thesis, trade-partner statistics analysis is used to check tlie 
magnitude of smuggling from Hong Kong to China, and heavy smuggling of 
electrical appliances and motorcycles from Hong Kong or Japan into China is 
found. 
Though Hong Kong is a free port, the Hong Kong government has 
in^posed heavy duties on cigarettes and automobile diesel oil to combat the 
negative externalities generated by the consumption of these commodities. 
Serious smuggling of cigarettes and automobile diesel oil from China into Hong 
Kong developed in the early 1990s. Fresh and frozen pork are also smuggled 
from China to Hong Kong to evade health inspection requirements. 
This thesis uses time series data of the 1980s when smuggling is 
negligible to estimate the demand function for the above commodities. The 
excess of predicted consumption over actual consumption in the 1990s is 
assumed to be due to smuggling. Serious smuggling of cigarettes and fresh and 
frozm pork is found in 1993 and of diesel oil is found in 1995. The tobacco duty 
evaded in 1993 was approximately HKS485million and the diesel oil duty evaded 
in 1995 was HK$222 million. It is concluded that the strengthened integration 
between Hong Kong and China in various aspect reduces the cost of smuggling 
and stimulates the incentive of smuggling-in activities in Hong Kong. 
# Remark: China, Mainland China and PRC in this thesis all stand for People's Republic of China. 
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Chapter 1 Economics Perspective of Smuggling 
1.1) Introduction 
Traditional trade theories almost ignore the existence of directly unproductive 
profit seeking (DUP) activities and their intact on the economic welfare. Actually, not 
all DUP activities are illegal, for example lobbying for a tariff and quota. One problem 
of lobbying is that resources，which would be enq)loyed in the production of real goods 
and services, are redirected for other unproductive uses. The output of the society are 
potentially reduced. However , successftil lobbying for a tariff may change the rewards 
to factors of production and thus be regarded be regarded as a revenue-seeking activity. 
Alternatively, rather than protection seeking, illegal DUP activities would evade 
tariffs or quotas once they have been enacted. Patterson (1989) believes that 
smuggling is a continuing problem in today's regional and international trade. 
Johnson(1974) makes the intuitive obvious statement that "smuggling is an ancient 
phenomenon". It is commonly agreed that smuggling must improve economic welfare 
when adopting the private welfare view. Regarding tariffs as merely an arbitrary 
governmental intervention in the efficient allocation of resources, smuggling increases 
economic welfare by reducing or eliminating the arbitrary distortions. This view is 
based on a purely ideological belief that anything that reduces the power of state must 
be beneficial, regardless of its economic effect. However, Johnson (1974) depicts the 
welfare from a macro-perspective and describes the smuggling's potential negative 
consequence. 
First of all, based on Johnson's welfare standard, successful law breaking 
activities like smuggling adversely affect society's moral fibre. Secondly, the smuggling 
would reduce the government, tariff revenue and its ability to provide the public goods. 
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It follows that if the public goods ” in question is a given level of domestic production 
ofiir^ort-substitutes to be achieved by a tariff smuggling thus increases the social cost 
for that provision. Commodities smuggling declines the share of the market of the 
domestic production and creates unenqjloyment in those industries. 
The pioneering model of smuggling is done by Bhagwati-Hansen (1973). 
Bhagwati focuses on a country with an import distortion- tariff and concludes that the 
net welfare effect is ambiguous. 
1.2)The Pioneering Model of Bhagwati-Hansen (1973) 
Bhagwati and Hansen model smuggling as an alternative trade technology for 
obtaining goods. They apply the Hicks - Samuelson value theoretical framework, whicli 
assumes tkat primary factors, in a perfect con^petition，produce two traded goods and 
that the country is small, i.e. the terms of trade being fixed. In their base case, they 
have two assumptions. First, the illegal trade is characterized by first non-prohibitive 
tariffs and second, the constant cost of transformation in illegal activities between 
exports and imports is at a rate lower than that associated with legal trade because 
illegal trade implies some "attrition"- for exanqjle, goods perish in transit or are thrown 
overboard when the detection is feared. In Fig 1.1, with free trade，a production 
possibility curve AB, and given an international price line PA，the maximum welfare is 
at Uf. If tariff is in^osed, the tarifif-inchisive price stimulates the production of 
importables, decreases the consumption and reduces the welfare. Provided that there is 
no smuggling, production , consumption and welfare is at Pt，Ct and Ut respectively. 
With smuggling , at a constant price line (transformation line) PSCS, it is less steep than 
the tangent to AB as Pt, legal trade ceases and welfare ends up at Us<Ut. Hence, 
smuggling reduces the economic welfare. In figure 1.2, this figure is identical with 
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figure 1.1 except that the smuggler's transformation line in the latter is less steep than 
the former. Legal trade is again eliminated but smuggling improves welfare : Us>Ut. 
The welfare change still cannot be determined in the case of increasing cost & 
monopoly in smuggling. 
Based on this model, the welfare effect of smuggling is quite ambiguous. When 
adopting Johnson's analytical framework, smuggling has two opposite effects on the 
economic welfare: (1) it increases the welfare insofar as additional quantities of the 
imported goods are made available and (2) it reduces the welfare by using additional 
resources in tlie process of obtaining the good. Johnson(1974) makes this point by 
drawing an analogy with the theory of the custom's union , the smuggling sector being 
the partner country in the union. As smuggling brings imports that replace domestic 
production of import-substitutes at a lower social cost, there is a welfare impioved 
trade creation ； but in so far as smuggling brings in imports that could otherwise have 
entered the country through a lower-cost legal channel, there is a welfare reduced trade 
diversion. 
The legal trade in both figs 1.1 & 1.2 is eliminated，given that the smuggler's 
transformation line is less steep than the tangent to the country's production frontier at 
pt ； when the corcpetitive smugglers' cost is constant and lower than tlie tariff -
inclusive price, legal trade cannot survive except in one case - illegal terms of trade is 
just equal to the tariff-inclusive legal-trade price. Bhagwati concludes that in Ms base 
case，no smuggling is better than any amount of smuggling and the less smuggling the 
better. There must be welfare reduction even if the assumptions are replaced by 
increasing cost and establishing of monopoly in smuggling. 
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Fig 1.1 Perfect competition in smuggling at constant costs. With free trade ’ 
reduction possibility curve AB, and given international price line P t Q , the welfare 
(maximum) is at U t . With tariff, the pr^bct ion, consumption and welfere are at P t , 
Q and U t ’ respectively , provided that no smuggling takes place. With smuggling， 
at constant priceline (transformation line) P. C,，less steep than the tangent to AB at 
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Figl.2. Perfect competition in smuggling at constant costs.(contd).Tliis figure is 
identical with fig. 1.1, except that now smuggling improves welfere U. > U t With 
the smuggler's transformation line less steep than the tangent at Pt legal trade is 
again eliminated. 
Source : Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) 
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One of the limitations in Bhagwati's model is that the real cost of smuggling is 
modeled by using the "melting ice “ assunqjtion. Sheikh (1974) postulates that the 
activity of smuggling requires the use of non-traded goods whicli directly uses domestic 
and primary factors. As such, it shifts the domestic transformation curve inward. The 
core difference between Bhagwati model and Sheikh model emerges from the "melting 
ice ” assumption which iirplies that the production possibility curve for producing the 
tradable goods is invariant to smuggling in Bhagwati's model. This is the result of 
illegal trade which impose a term of trade loss, and no production or consumption gain 
will follow. In the Sheikh model, the presence of illegal trade does utilize primary 
factors and therefore affects the tradable outputs that are produced. The withdrawal of 
resources into the illegal trade means that less resources are available for producing the 
tradables that enter the utility function. As elaborated by Bhagwati (1983)，since the 
situation is distortionary in view of the tariff，this reduction of the availability of 
primary factors means that there may have an inqjrovement, rather than a deterioration 
in welfare. Thus, wken illegal and legal trade coexist, gain is possible in the Sheikh 
model，whereas it does not occur in the Bhagwati-Hansen model. 
Besides the real cost of smuggling , another limitation of Bhagwati is that the 
legal trade would not survive except when the illegal term of trade is just equal to the 
tariff-inclusive legal trade price ratio. Reflecting this, Pitt (1981) argues that legal trade 
may be necessary for illegal trade to be carried out without an excessive fear of 
detection. Therefore illegal trade and legal trade co-exist and the losses on legal trade, 
as observed in Indonesia, are really generating more ofi&etting profits on the illegal 
trade that than legal trade helps to camouflage. Pitt's model focuses on the export-
smuggling and the smuggling fimction is : 
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S 二 g U , s ) � 
where S is the quantity of good X smuggled, I is the quantity of good X legally 
traded, s is the quantity of good X input into smuggling activities and g(.) is a strictly 
concave and twice continuously differentiable linear homogenous function. The 
additional assim^ption includes (i) the marginal product of legal trade is non-negative 
and (ii) a unit increases in the smuggling input results in a positive but less than unit 
increase in actual (ex post) smuggling . The difference between ex ante smuggling s and 
ex post smuggling S , is the cost of smuggling and is non-negative. 
Profit maxiniization in production implies that the production is on the 
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of transformation equals domestic 
relative price q .The c[ represents fixed international terms of trade and t is the export 
tax rate.lhQ trader's/smugglers decision is then to maximize profits 
n 二 qfg(I,s) + q f(l-t)I - qs (I+s) � 
Since firms would earn zero economic profits because the revenue from all foreign 
trade is just equal to the domestic cost of the tradables. Setting (2) equal to zero and 
solving for qs yields an expression for the equilibrium domestic price as the weighted 
average of all trades : 
qs 二 qf S/(I+s) + qf (l-t)I/(I+s>- (3) 
Note that the optimization problem of firms could be equivalently stated as maxirnizmg 
qs, the domestic price ratio. That is to say that firms choose the mix of legal trade and 
smuggling , which provides the highest rate of transformation in trade. This is in 
contrast to Bhagwati and Sheikh as the illegal domestic price of a commodity, which is 
both legally traded and smuggled，is not its legal trade price. 
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1.3) The Application of Smuggling Literature in Hong Kong 
Almost all these models except Pitt's focus on the import side of developing 
countries, which impose a tariff or other trade barriers on the protection of domestic 
import-substituting industries. Even though Pitt's analysis is for a country with e?qport 
distortion - export tax，his analysis is about a country with both inq)ort and Qxport 
distortion. 
All the above-mentioned models, however, cannot be applied to Hong Kong 
because Hong Kong is a free port and has no tarifife and export taxes. Even though 
there are some duties imposed on cigarette and petroleum for combating the 
externalities of pollution and traffic congestion, those duties are not tariffs since they 
are imposed on the domestic production as well as the inqjorts of cigarette and 
petroleum. Additional^，regarding the value seized for HK/China smuggling, shown in 
Table 2.4.1 of Chapter 2, smuggling-out figures are greater than those of smuggling in. 
The launch of economic reform after the third plenary session of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China raised the living standard of the nationals 
and induced their inqjort demand. Increases in smuggling activities into China should 
increase Hong Kong's exports and unambiguously raise economic welfare in Hong 
\ 
Kong • 
The offer curve technique under the general equilibrium approach is used to 
illustrate how smuggling would increase imports and thus increase the exports of 
trading partners. As shown in Figure 2 for a large country case，the Foreign offer 
curve's 1 represented by OF. The Home offer curve in the absence of tariff is 
1 The foreign curve is assumed to be elastic. This is obviously true when the Home country is small, as 
assumed by Bhagwati and others 
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represented by OH. The free trade equilibrium is determined by the intersection of OF 
& OH and the terms of trade is Pf. Once the tariff is inqposed for the Home country，the 
offer curve shifts from OH to OH1 and the post-tariff terms of trade is OPt. The Home 
country's terms of trade would be kqproved. At the tariff-inclusive price Pd, the Home 
country would exchange 0 ¾ of its export for BEt of the Foreign country's e?qport. 
However, under post-tariffs terms of trade, the Foreign country's export is OMt. This 
is under the simplest assunq)tion that the vertical distance AB，the tariff revenue would 
be wholly accrued to the Home government without any redistribution to the 
consumers. 
As in Bhagwati's model, the worst case would arise if the domestic price ratio of 
the Home country in the presence of smuggling is equal to the tariffincluave price Pa 
in Figure2 i tccause the whole tariff revenue previously collected by the government 
would be wasted in smuggling under Bhagwati's melting ice assunq>tion. However, 
foreign buanesses will not be affected since it still enjoys the same quantity of export as 
in the absence of smuggling. 
When the terms of trade under smuggling is Ps, between the smugglers' price 
post-tariff terms of trade and tariff-inclusive price Pd, the Home country will exchange 
0ES of its export for Foreign E?q>ort EES. The corresponding terms of trade for the 
Foreign country with the presence of smuggling is Pe and its export is 0MS，which is 
greater than the export quantity under tariff. Additionally, only the vertical distance CE 


















































































































































































Under the assumption of no trade distortion imposed by the partner country， 
Figure 2 shows that smuggling will increase the export of partner countries and bring 
them unambigious welfare gain. 
Hong Kong has mainly provided re-export service for Mainland China since the 
late 1980s. Being a small open economy without import & export distortion, 
neighboring to the huge economy of China , the increase of demand within China 
would increase the trade volume, including legal and illegal，between Hong Kong and 
China. As there is no export tax levied by the Hong Kong Government, smuggling-out 
activities would not reduce the revenue to the Government. Smugglers in Hong Kong 
could enjoy more business . 
The smuggling literature, as in the abovementioned analysis, just focus on the 
tariff instead of control of contraband such as firearm or drugs. Contraband goods are 
seldom mentioned in literature because the economic welfare change brought by their 
illegal inflow is unambigiously negative. However, a study in smuggling between Hong 
Kong and China should take these factors into consideration. The increase in 
smuggling-out figures to Mainland China from the late 1980s，induced by China's 
economic reform，may strengthen organized crime. This leads the smuggling-in oftlie 
illegal immigrants and firearms back to Hong Kong . Whether this is the case depends 
upon the form of smuggling. 
Theoretically，when Hong Kong residents bribe the China Custom Officers and 
then cross the border with smuggled commodities to Mainland China, the situation of 
law and order in China will be worse off This may not affect law and order in Hong 
Kong and the businessmen could enjoy the increase of trade volume and HK's welfare 
will unambiguously be improved. On the other hand, some would argue that the same 
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officer might be bribed for smuggling-out of dangerous commodities, say drugs, to 
Hong Kong. Thus smuggling-out may lead to smuggling-in. 
Fung( 1997a) introduces quasi-legitimate ways to circumvent China's trade 
restrictions by breaking down the quantities into small bundles. The small packets are 
sent across the border and then reassembled on the other side of the border. Fung 
points out that for certain goods in China，duties can be exempted if they are imported 
in small amounts. Furthermore, Laroque(1994) provides a detailed description of 
smuggling of foreign beer under the abovementioned method. After a Guangzhou 
customer places an order for a container of foreign beer, for example, a Hong Kong 
trading company ships the container to Macau and unloads the container a few metres 
from the border crossing. The cardboard cases are then opened and the cans are then 
disturbed, six apiece, to travelers bounding for China. Each traveler pays a deposit 
equivalent to the Chinese retail value of tlie cans and is directed to report to a collection 
station once across the border • Upon arrival in Zhuhai, the travelers deliver the beer 
and each receives his deposit plus an addition reward (USS0.23-.34). The em^ty cases 
are exported across the border to a “ collection station ” operated by a Zhuhai 
company , whose workers collect, repackage and reloade the cans onto a truck for a 
delivery to the Guangzhou customers. This system allows suppliers in Hong Kong to 
deliver goods to the Pearl River Delta customers within two days after receiving order. 
Laroque quotes his information as saying that half pack of the China-bound travelers 
are carrying packs of Carlsberg, San Miguel, Pabst Blue Ribbon in addition to other 
products like soft drinks and soap- for resale to the collection stations on the Chinese 
side of the border. The whole process described by Laroque is legal and involve not 
even any illegal component, like corruption, which may bring negative feedback to 
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Hong Kong. This exarqple of tariff evasion brings unambiguous welfare gain to Hong 
Kong. 
In contrast, if smuggling-out involves the transportation of commodities by tai fei 
(high powered speedboat), this may abet smuggling-in because tai-fei can easily 
transport firearm or illegal immigrant in its return trip to Hong Kong. The positive 
effect of smuggling-out will be offset by the negative consequence of its by-product-
organized crime. Once the linkage between Hong Kong & China smuggling syndicate is 
developed, the illegal business would not end up with just one way flow of commodity. 
After transporting the smuggled goods illegally from Hong Kong to China, tai fei will 
not return with nothing. It will carry with illegal immigrants and firearms back to Hong 
Kong. 
The case for illegal immigrant can be evidenced by anti-prostitution work 
conducted in 1995-96. At that year, many Mainland Chinese women，who were assisted 
by local triads to sneak into Hong Kong and earned income through prostitution, were 
arrested by the police. Lo (1996) quoted his source as saying that some of them went to 
Hong Kong from Fujian and Shenzhen by tai fei and they were required to pay for their 
passages to Hong Kong by prostituing in the territory. 
Unlike illegal immigrants, there is no sufficient evidence for the channel of 
transportation of firearms. The information for the increased use of Mainland China 
manufactured firearms in Hong Kong can be found from several volume of researcli 
works. Vagg (1991 & 1992) finds that a variety of handguns of different types and 
calibres were seized by the Hong Kong Police in operations prior 1987 but the 
predominant weapon has been the Chinese-style 'T54"，vMck was the standard 
People's Liberation Army hand-gun. He believes that most of them certainly arrived in 
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Hong Kong from China. Lo (1992) points out that in addition to the use of handguns 
and submachine guns, Chinese-made military grenades were tossed more frequently by 
armed robbers. In 1991, only seven were used ； but till the first half of 1992 , the 
number was doubled • 
1.4) Influence of Underground Economy to Government Policy 
Last but not the least，tke underground economy would distort policy making. 
Mcgee & Feige (1989)argue that both activist countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy 
based on traditional automatic stabilizers can produce destabilizing rather than the 
intended stabilizing effect，whenever such policies are based on tlie systematically faulty 
information brought by unrecorded economic activity . In the case of smuggling-out in 
Hong Kong，if the Government tries to inclement fiill employment target policy，it may 
result in overheating of the economy and price instability due to the ignorance of hidden 
employment in illegal sector. The scale of underground economy in Hong Kong is not 
observable but this should be taken into account by policy makers. 
To sum up, the irr^ort smuggling model cannot be applied in Hong Kong 
because the illegal export is its major activity. The illegal smuggling out activities 
alone can bring positive welfare effect but its by product-organized crime, would 
disturb law and order. The occurrence of the by-product depends on the form of 
smuggling. The wel&re effect of smuggling out is thus ambigious. 
In Chapter 2, detailed analysis would be made for the seriousness of smuggling-
out activities and the efforts having been made by the Hong Kong Government to 
tackle the probleiiL Additionally, the reason for the sustained smuggling-in activities 
of Mainland China would also be explored. Finally, Japan has been chosen as a sanqjle 
country for the trade partner statistical analysis with Mainland China. 
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In Chapter 3，the smuggling-in activities of Hong Kong in the early 1990s will 
be analysed. Lai (1994) has estimated the import demand of Hong Kong as a function 
of real income and relative price of commodities. He then con^ared tiie predicted 
imports with recorded imports of Hong Kong to estimate the smuggling-out to 
Mainland China. However, his estimation was too aggregated as it was based on SITC 
groups. Each SITC group included thousands of commodities and only a few were 
smuggled. In this thesis, the commodities chosen for empirical analysis were those 
with serious records of smuggling, for instance pork, cigarette and diesel oil. The data 
on seizure were provided by officers of Customs and Excise Department in personal 
interviews. Smuggling is also active for other commodities, say video compact disc, 
but they are not discussed in this thesis due to lack of data. 
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CHAPTER 2 A” nv r^all analy^^ nfHong Kong- China Smu^Hi^ in 1990s 
2.1) The Background 
Hong Kong has historically been a freeport. Hie only restrictive items are 
weapons and drugs ； the major dutiable items are tobacco, alcohol and petrochemicals, and 
the only major trade restrictions are Voluntary Export Restraints" on textiles. Therefore, 
feW goods were smuggled out from Mainland China to Hong Kong, except herbal 
medicine & antique，which were controlled by Mainland China Government. 
Cooper (1974) considers that smuggling may occur in two ways: (i) smuggling 
which used tke illegal channels of importation and exportation and (ii) fake invoicing， 
w h icii implied that there are errors or omissions in the balance of payment account. Before 
discussing the former type of smuggling in detail，the over/imderinvoicing case will be 
briefly reviewed in the next paragraph. 
I - F r o m the previous research of imderinvoicing between Hong Kong & China , 
Ma(1985) shows that the local authorities of Mainland China could circumvent central 
government control by establishing paper companies in Hong Kong in the 1980s. Tliose 
companies could over-invoice by legally charging a commission oyer and above tke import 
^price. Hie foreign exchange would then be deposited overseas. China gave high priority to 
import of technology and equipment to facilitate modeniization. The detection of over-
invoicing in importing oftechnology and equipment was particularly difficult. Sung (1995) 
finds that there appeared to be a significant evasion of foreign exchange control through 
under-invoicing of exports in 1992. In that year, Hong Kong's imports from China as 
recorded in the Hong Kong Trade Statistics were US$44.19billion. However, China's 
exports to Hong Kong recorded in China Customs Statistics were only US$37.51 billion, 
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which was 85% oftke Hong Kong figure and was greater than the difference between the 
£o.b. value and the c.i.£ value of 5%. Hiis implied that China's exports to Hong Kong 
were under-invoiced by at least 10%. Sung pointed that as Guangdong has the largest 
n i i m b e r of subsidiaries in Hong Kong , the iinder-invoicing of Guangdong export was 
likely to be more prevalent than other provinces. 
2.2) Smuggling in 1990 
Smuggling-out of consumer items was not a major issue to be tackled by Hong 
Kong authorities in 1980s. Until the summer of 1990, the major crimiiial offense involved 
in smuggling-out, under the Hong Kong Justice System was that of carrying unmanifested 
cargo by land or sea. Under Import & Export Ordinance 1986, Section 17, and subsidiary 
regulations ’ boats and vehicles across Hong Kong borders were required to list out the 
goods on board，their country of origin and their destination. Hie maximum penalty was 
severe - a fine of HBC$50,000 and up to two years in^risonment. A subsidiary offense 
(Sectionl4(I) Import & E>qport Ordinance) was altering a vessel or vehicle in order to 
make a disguised compartment or hiding place, irrespective of whether anything was 
hidden in the compartment when it was discovered. The maxiimmi penalty was a fine of 
HK$10,000 and six months' imprisonment. However, Vagg(1992) believed that 
prosecution was rare. On the other hand, for the Chinese side，smuggling was a serious 
problem，in view of the revenue consideration. Since Chinese government levies strong 
protectionistic import/export duties on television, video-recorder & cigarette and their 
prices are rather high in Mainland China. Hence, substantial amounts of these items were 
smuggled from Hong Kong to the Mainland China, resulting in a significant reduction of 
tariff revenue for the PRC Goveinment. 
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The Hong Kong Government was forced to face the problem of smuggling-out in 
the summer of 1990. Smuggling became a public concern after a smugglers' speedboat (tai 
fei) rammed and capsized a Hong Kong police dinghy in Tolo Harbor and one of the 
officers on board died in June 1990. As supported by Vagg’s arguement (1993)，symbols 
r a t l i e r than mimbers determined whether crime issues became defined as problems. 
Hence , the public's awareness of the smuggling problem was aroused by the symbol of 
death of the officer, rather than the recorded smuggling statistics. 
Moreover, stealing vehicles in Hong Kong for shipment to Mainland China 
became more severe in 1990. Referring to Lo's study (1991)，a total of 6,434 vehicles, 
mainly Mercedes Benz and Toyota Cxovm sedans, was stolen in 1990. This figure was 
38% more than in 1989. Only 68% ofthe number of missing vehicles were recovered. In 
fact, the cars after stolen were immediately driven to deserted areas in the New Territories. 
Afterwards they would be loaded onto speedboats, and swiftly smuggled to China by 
racketeers. These high-powered speedboats were steel-reinforced and equipped with four 
200-horsepower engines. The racketeers could readily overturn Marine Police launches by 
their tai-fei. At this point, Hong Kong authorities realised that the matters were out of 
hand. They were obliged to enact a new legislation to control this problem • 
2.3) Measures to Combat Outward Smuggling of Hong Kong in 1990s 
Several new legal provisions were enacted since 1990 to combat outward 
smuggling. The principal aim was to control the use of tai fei: 
(i) Sec 31 ofthe Import & Export Ordinance, enacted in 1990, limits the total engine 
capacity of speedboats was no more than 600hp and the total fuel load not more than 180 
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gallons. These boats are prohibited from operating between sunset and sunrise and no 
longer permitted to carry more than 200 cigarettes and/or a single television set or VCR. 
j (ii)Tlie Import and Export (Carriage of Articles) Regulations (Cap 60 sub leg) which came 
to effect since April 1991. Requirements are added to obtain 'carriage licenses' from 
Director of Trade for the transportation of television sets, VCRs, air - conditioners, 
refrigerators, and vehicle or vehicle parts by vessels less than 250 tons. These licenses 
specify goods' destination and its route. Therefore，this regulation greatly facilitated the 
task of the security force to investigate whether the owner of vessels intended to smuggle 
sucli goods or not. The maximum prison term on conviction in this case remained，as for 
t h e 0ffense of carrying unmanifested goods, two years but the maximum fine was increased 
tenfold from HK$50,000 to HK$500,000. In 1994，the fine for the offenses of 
unmanifested cargo and the lack of carriage license was amended to be more stringent-
Fine $2,000,000 & imprisonment for 7 years. 
Besides the legal amendment，an Anti-Smuggling Task Force was established in 
1991. This new unit, consisted of officers from the Custom & Excise DepartmentC4&E 
Dep)，the Royal Hong Kong Police and the Royal Navy, attempted to maximize the use of 
the expertise, experience and equipment of these three services. The task force was under 
the police operational command，and also co-operated with C&ED and Navy. The Task 
Force closed down the Tolo Harbour which provided about fifty landing sites and about 
80% of smuggling-out activities happened there . The Task Force used fouling nets，out 
of service patrol vessels as well as deep water mooring buoys to erect a 1.3km boom to seal 
off the harbour. However, a 250-metre gap was left for vessels to pass through. This gap 
could be closed in about seven minutes for officers to seize tai-fei when they were on 
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—smuggling operations. Smugglers were forced to load at Lau Fau Shan，Junk Bay and 
even spots inside the busy Victoria Harbour. 
la 氧 the government attempted to tackle smuggling via the establishment of 
law regulations and a multi-disciplinary force. TTie effect of these measures will be 
discussed. Before that, series of seized figure relevant to Hong Kong-China smuggling 
would be reviewed. 
2.4) Preliminary Review of Hong Kong-China Smuggling 
In this section, it is assumed that greater seized volmne implies an increase of 
smuggling activities. Table 2.4.1 shows that the seizure cases increased significantly in 
b o t h sea & land routes between Hong Kong & China from 1991 to 1994. In general, the 
total seizure cases and the arrest of smuggling-out from Hong Kong to Mainland China 
exceeded those oftke s m u g g l i n g - i n from Mainland China to Hong Kong in the early 1990s. 
H.e total number of cases and the value of the recovered snrnggMg-in goods seized by 
Hong Koxxg Custom in 1993 were 5 & 10 times of those in 1992 respectively. The 
increasing trend of smuggling-in activities seemed to be suspended in 1995, wken 
xneasuredbythetotalmmiber&vahxeseizedwMdi respectively decreased from 59 cases 
in 1994 to 35 cases in 1995 and from HK$57million in 1994 to HK$45 million in 1995. 
However, the seized value in 1995 w a s s t i l l 24.5 times of that in 1992. 
Regarding the smuggling-out activities，the trend changed remarkably in 1993. 
As shown in Table 2.4.1 , there was a substantial drop in aroimd 50% of the seaborne 
smuggling-out cases and the value seized when compared mth the corresponding figures 
[； k l 9 9 2 . A c c 0 r d i n g U ) t l i e a i i i m a l r e p 0 r t 0 f C i i s t 0 m s & E X d S e D e p a r t m € n t l 9 9 3 , t l i e i : e a S ( m 
for downward shift provided by the C& E Department was the devaluation of Chinese 
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currency in association with the increase in the value of Japanese Yen. Consequently, the 
c o s t of smuggling items-mainly electrical appliances increased. Another reason was the 
macro-economical adjustment made by the Chinese Govermnent in which the money 
supply was reduced. That entrenchment policy had a cooling effect on the black market， 
whicli caused a drop in the demand of the black market Moreover, the legislation seemed ‘ . , ^ 
t 0 have a deterrent effect，which brought a major decline in speedboat smuggling in 1993. 
The decrease in the number of seized cases related to seaborne smuggling-out continued in 
1994 & 1995 . la contrast the value seized increased to $379 million in 1995，which was 
5.2 times oftliat in 1993. 
Table 2.4.1 HK/China Smuggling Seizure Statistics by Sea Route & Land Route 
^ Y E ^ SEA (IN) SEA(OUT) — 
c ^ " " " Arrest"""Valu<HK$) ~ C a s e # Arrest Value(HK$) 
-J^i ^ ~ ； ~ n 762^ 04 639 1081 139,114,430 ” 
7 7 miOO 640"""" 905 174,210,585 “ 
is ~19 1,051,660 - - - 324 _ 一 503……„ 72,947,453 
55 5^  2,404,223 1 4 7 3 5 4 240^ 05,260 
"7595 n 33 3,302,442 109"""" 205 379,865,057 
LAND (IN) LAND (OUT) 
" “ “ A ^ i V a l u e ( H K $ ) C a s e # A r r e s t Value(HK$) 
-^91 5 4 1,039,894 63 106 36,412,895 
^ 9 9 2 5 ~ “ ~ 5 1,578,500 81 112 49力6,146 
52 15,411-37. “101"""‘ 136 78,825,093 
1 ¾ 19""“““―30 55325,430 62 105 30,230^ 89 — 
-^ 995 23 30 42,092^ 49 66 92 44,728,510 — 
Note : (l)The statistics from 1992 exclude narcotics，incoming dutiable commodities，textiles 
with false origin and goods with false trade description 
(2) Arrests include person & company served with summons and without seizure. 
(3) # include cases of anti - smuggling Task Force 
Source: Customs and Excise Department，personal communication 
Smuggling-out through the border became more popular in 1993. The mmiber 
of smuggling-out cases at that year seized through land route increased from 81 to 101 and 
the seized value was $78 mmion. That was 1.6 times oftliat in 1992. When refered to the 
number of smuggling out cases through land route，the number of seized case continuously 
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decreased to 66 and $45遍孤，which was 65% and 57% of those in 1993. The linritation 
of the figures in Table 2.4.1 was that the classification of seizures into “smuggling -in” and 
"smuggling-out" solely depended on the declaration of smugglers. Hiey might not teH the 
truth. Thus，additional evidence was needed. 
2.5) Preliminary Assessment of the Anti-smuggling Measures 
Table 2.5.1 Reported Case for Stolen Vehicles 
Y e a r 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 朔 
Total No. 6475 6918 4630 4537 4261 
Source : Hong Kong Annual Report published by Government Monnation Services Department，various i ssue""“ 
As argued by Vagg , the anti-smuggling effort was strengthened as Hong Kong 
discovered the vehicles shipment to Mainland China in 1991. A preliminary assessment of 
the anti-smuggling effort can be derived from the number of reported stolen vessels as 
show in Table 2.5.1. Hie number of the reported stolen vehicles has declined since 1993 
and after the introduction ofnew anti-smuggling legislation and the establishment of anti-
smuggling task force. According to the annual repoit of Government Monnation Services 
Department (GIS), it showed the decline in the theft of luxury vehicles starting from 1993. 
However, it was reported the stealing and smuggling of two types of vehicles increased . 
Tliey were (i)left-hand-driven vehicles and (ii)mid-raiige saloons and small capacity 
motorcycles. la GIS report 1995 , it emphasized that the seizures of smuggled left-hand 
drive vehicles in transit through Hong Kong increased. Tliis may probably be due to the 
effectiveness of the clampdown by the Chinese authorities on the registration of right-hand 
drive vehicles. Therefore, the smugglers smuggled the left- hand drive vehicles into 
Mainland China, for the sake of avoiding the registration. 
The figures of smuggling out private vehicles s e i z e d b y the Customs & Excise 
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Department was shown in Table 2.5.L Hie tendency to smuggle the vehicles mainly 
through sea route was unchanged in the 1990s. The number and value of private vehicles 
seized decreased in 1994 as expected but the tendency reversed in 1995. 
Table 2.5-2 The Seizure of Private Vehicles Smuggled out to China as Goods 
“ p private Car# Stolen Private Car 
) Q t y Value $ Qty Value $ 
1991 ^ 
Sea 22 1,262,760 0 0 
Landj 0 Q 0 0 
"1992 
S e a 37 1,951,000 15 8,980,000 
L a n d 4 1,114,000 4 2,080,000 
1993 “ 
Sea 152 4,850,000 20 7,250,000 
Land 0 0 13 15，400，000 
1994 
Sea 127 2,713,000 5 2,500,000 
Land 1 300,000 “ 0 0 
1995 
Sea 166 43,549,900 45 12,000,000 
Land 0 a 0 0 
# not including stolen private car 
Source : Customs & Excise Departmait, Personal Communication ————. 
Detailed Hong Kong sourced information for the smuggling of electrical 
appUance and cigarette was not available. When referring back to Mainland China's 
information，the smuggling situation was still serious after 1991. It was estimated by the 
Chinese Governemnt that in 1995 China lost more than 15 billion yuan in tariffs for foreign. 
cigarette and only 600,000 cases out of 5 million cases of smuggled foreign cigarettes 
were successfully seized (Bering Review, June 3-9, 1996). Regarding the camera 
industry, the smuggling in 1995 led the state tariff to lose over 2 billion yuan. This amount 
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was equal to that required for establishing 10 large camera manufacturing plants with a 
total yearly output of some 3 billion yuan. Rampant smuggling forced most of the domestic 
cameras manufacturers out of market To combat this serious situation，new rules were 
issued by State Administration for Industry & Commerce. Hiey stipulated that all 
p；'； imported cameras had to be registered ^ t h the administration and the case identification 
numbers would be recorded on a national computer network • Hien a special mark for tke 
item would be attacked to show their registration number and verified authentically. 
(Bering review, September 16-22 ,1996). 
2.6) The Reason for Sustained Smuggling 
Given the loss of tariff revenue , the leaders of the Central Government of 
Mainland China insisted on combating the smuggling activities . In contrast，the general 
public and the leaders at the local level were more lenient in attacking smuggling as they 
regarded smuggling as an. economic benefit to them. 
(I) The benefit for the public and smugglers 
The launch of economic reform in 1980s brought in the Western consumption 
pattern to people in Mainland China and those residents with higher level of income foHow 
those pattterns. Their demand shifted from the local production to the inq>orted 
commodities. Even though the producers tried to manufacture similar commodities，they 
cannot stimulate consumers to consume their products since the native technology could 
not match with the consumer preference. In addition, these commodities，say television & 
motor vehicles, have high duty rates. Hence, smuggling is capable of satisfying the demand 
of imported commodities at a lower price. Blass(1993) points out that a smuggled 
Panasonic 33-inch color TV set costed around 18,000 RMB but an identical TV set was 
23 
listed RMB 25,600 legitimately in Yaohan Department Store in Peking. 
From the smugglers' point ofview, Mosher(1992) reports that the low smuggling 
cost coupled with a higher profit margin stimulate smuggling activity，as only 18 minutes 
were needed to load and deliver a car to a mainland shore. Blass(1993) postulates that the 
profit margin was approximately 10% above than in Hong Kong for television sets . This 
urged smugglers to continue this illegal business. Moreover, for Mainland China's 
smugglers, the illegal activities provide them a more stable source of income than investing 
in legal business because Beijing leader's policy on economic reform oftem fluctuate, 
(n) The benefit to the leaders at the local government level 
Smuggling-in Mainland China reduces the Central Government's tariff revenue. 
In contrast, localities that specialise in smuggling might obtain benefit from the activity. 
Stone Lion in Fujian was the always quoted example . Stone Lion was famous for selling 
pornography，foreign cigarettes and even guns & drugs in the year around 1991. Kaye 
( 1 9 9 5 ) quotes Lin Qingsheng, an economist ofthe Chinese Commercial Bank's Xiamen 
Branch, as saying that the residents in Stone Lion successfully used the capital they earned 
from the shady dealing to climb into legitimate business. 
At the local level ’ the authorities would clanq) down on every fifth or sixth tai fei 
roaring through their jurisdiction, aiming at demonstrating their diligence in attacking 
smuggling, but not enough to discourage smugglers with their tokens of gratitude for 
cooperation. Once the confiscated goods were sold，the funds would then be channeled in 
the most profitable activities. Mosher(1992) believes that this was the main reason for 
rapid development of property in Huizhou，a municipality in Guangdong province. 
Futhennore, Vagg (1992) quotes his example saying that cars stolen from Hong 
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Kong could not be driven in China by just anyone who would pay for them. Ex-Hong Kong 
ears would stand out by virtue of their right-hand drive (legally imported vehicles were left 
liand drive). Due to this visibility, Vagg believes that the market for many cars was 
restricted to those who were effectively above the law-senior provincial Party and 
goveinment officials. His speculation is further confirmed by a car smuggling case 
committed by a former mayor ofDandong City in Northeast China's Liaoning Province-
Cliaiig Yi Chang was reported to coordinate among the frontier stations, ports and 
financial departments and to call a meeting of the executives of six local banks to put up 
loans totaling 4 million yuan for the car smuggling scheme. (Beijing Review, January 1-7, 
1996). 
2.7) Trade Partner Statistics Analysis 
Firm statistical evidence of illegal trade activities is not readily available in 
published record. Researchers interested in this subject, therefore, have tried to make 
inferences from the behaviour of officially recorded trade. The most widely used method 
has been to examine discrepancies in data concerning trade between partners. This analysis 
was useful for over/under invoicing where the illegal trade took place through a legal entry 
point or for cases in which the customs officers were bribed. 
Apart from smuggling，discrepancies in trade statistics can be due to : 
(i) time lags so that China' import from its partner has not yet reached the 
PRChina custom. 
(ii) differences of valuation as imports are valued on c.i.f. and exports are valued 
on f.o.b. This can be remedied by the conq)arisoii in quantity instead of value, 
(indifferences of commodity classification where an item is put under a wrong 
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category by either Chinese or its trade partners' Custom offices. 
McDonald (1986) has made empirical analysis for some countries and concluded 
t h a t given concerns about data quality，a low trade data discrepancies does not necessarily 
imply that smuggling activity is moderate. Large discrepancies in trade data could exist in 
Mexico where little incentive to smuggle was present. In contrast，significant smuggling 
incentives existed in Zaire but the data discrepancy was only small. Bhagwati (1964) 
attempts to analyze the discrepancies between Turkey's imports and its individual trade 
partners ’ export. Bhagwati believes that his analysis provides not a conclusive proof，but 
only a strong indication in the presence of underinvoicing of imports in the Turkish case. 
West (1995) has made a reconcilation of China's trade statistics with its various 
trading partner for the year 1992. He believes that smuggling contributes to those 
discepancies. According to South Korea Customs, between January and April 1993 , 
South Korea exported 26,688 cars to China; however，China Customs statistics showed 
that only 166 cars imported from South Korea. For Japan，West found that it exported 
1.51 million colour television sets and 1.07 million video recorders to China ； however , 
China statistics in 1993 showed only 370,000 color television sets and 560,000 video 
recorders were imported . For these two consumer durables, PRC Government lost 4.86 
billion yuan import tariffs. Additionally，West quotes bis source of information and found 
that 35% of Mainland China's smuggling cases uncovered in the first quarter of 1994 
involved the use of fake customs certificates, seals and customs officer's signature. The 
faked documents assisted Guangxi officals in smuggling 798 cars in 1993. 
In this section, the trade partner statistics comparison focuses on the consumer 
items and motor vehicles , which are commodities mostly preferred by smugglers . Those 
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commodities are mostly iinported from Japan and South Korea. Japan is chosen as example 
and its export to Mainland China for the period from 1993-1995 would be analysed. 
West (1995) has tried to reconcile the figure of telecommunications equipment，which 
included television receivers，tape and video recorders. Hie reconcilation of China 
reported imports figure from Japan in 1992 with that of Japan reported export to China is 
based on the value terms of SITC Revision-3 Code, somced from United Nations 
commodity trade data. The result was that there was -43 % difference between China 
imports and Japan exports( China reported imports from Japan was US$930 million and 
Japan reported exports to China was US$1437 million). 
Apart from direct export，there may have been some commodities indirectly re-
exported through Hong Kong to China, they should also be included for the comparison 
with China's import but this was not taken into account in West's analysis. Referring to 
Sung(1996), the share in China's total imports of Hong Kong's re-exports of third 
co皿try goods to China rose from 1.7 per cent in 1979 to 36% in 1994. TTiis significant 
portion of re-export commodity should be considered for the trade statistics comparison. 
When including the re-export figure in the analysis，the trade-partner statistics 
technique would only work if China classifies its import by country of origin. Sung (1994) 
pointed that before 1993, China did not consistently classify imports by country of origin. 
Classification by country of consignment was sometimes used. Starting 1993，China has 
consistently classified its imports by country of origin. 
In 1993, China's imports from Hong Kong was US$10,473 million (1992 : 
US$20,538 mfflion)，which was quite close to Hong Kong's domestic exports to China, 
US$8，124 mmion(1992: US$7,943 million). The ratio of China's imports from Hong 
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Kong to Hong Kong's domestic exports to China was 2.58 in 1992 but the ratio decreased 
to 1.30 in 1993. This shows tfiat the accuracy of Chinese trade statistics on the import side 
lias been greatly improved to ascertain the country of origin since the 1993 reclassification. 
Hence，the sarqple period 1993-95 was selected for the trade partner statistics comparison. 
Apart from value comparision, the quantity analysis is also used to avoid the 
different valuation base in inqport & export figure. Additionally, to lessen the time lag 
problem，the comparison is for the 3 years cummulative figure (1993-95). 
Even though the published statistics from Japan , Hong Kong & Mainland 
China are in Harmonized System Classification, the 7 th digit of commodity code is 
different in those countries. Hence，the comparison is based on grouping the quantity of 
commodity under each common 6 digits commodity code except the motor vehicles. Due 
to numerous sub-division within each head of motor vehicles, there may be different 
classification between countries. The comparison is then based on the 4 digits commodity 
code. 
The result of trade partner statistics analysis in quantity basis is shown in Table 
2.7.1. The discrepancies for all electrical appliances (under code no. 852) was negative 
within the sample period，which meant that the inq>ort of China from Japan was less than 
the sum of direct export from Japan to Mainland China and indirect re-export through 
Hong Kong. Except for video-recording or reproducing appartus , the discrepancies of 
electricial appiicances were over 70%. This quantity figure discrepancies are quite 
consistent with West's discrepancies in 1992 . 
The discrepancy for the total number of motor vehicles under Head 8702,8703 & 
8704 was only 0.61%, indicating negligible smuggling. For motor vehicles, the small 
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discrepancy in^Hes that those motor vehicles transported to Mainland China from Hong 
Kong by tai fei (high powered speedboat) were mostly stolen vehicles. 
SimiHarily，the different codes under Head 8711 are grouped into item-
motorcycle" • The discrepancy for “ motorcycle ” is -54.89% whicli indicates that there 
have been heavy smuggling of motorcycles from Hong Kong or Japan into China. 
Table 2.7.2 shows the result of trade partner statistics analysis in value basis. For 
all commodities exanmied(iiicludkg motor vehicles), the value of China's _ o r t s from 
japan fall short of Japanese exports to China by more than 30 percent. Normally, the value 
of imports should exceed that of exports by around 5 percent due to the cost of insurance 
and feight. The shortfall of over 30 percent indicates serious smuggling or under-invoicing. 
For the case of motor vehicles, the shortfall appears to be mostly imderinvoicing，as Table 
2.7.1 indicates that the smuggling of Japanese motor vehicles is negligible. It should be 
noted that the tariffs on motor vehicles in China were very high : around 230% for 
passenger vehicles and around 70% for goods vehicles. There is thus an obvious incentive 
to under-invoice. 
The above analysis mainly focuses on the smuggling out from Hong Kong to 
Mainland China, whicli was substantial before 1990s. The major reasons for smuggling 
w e r e tke high duty rates and quota evasion. The smuggling-in cases became serious in the 
e a r l y 1990s in Hong Kong. The prevalences & causes of those smuggling-in activities 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3 Smuggling-in from Mainland China to Hong Kong in 1990s 
3.1 Introduction 
(i) The theoretical cause of smuggling 
When considering the cause of smuggling phenomenon, Sheikh (1977) points out 
that the price divergence between the foreign market and the domestic market of a commodity 
created an incentive for the smuggling of that good. Within foreign sector policies, SiLeikh 
points that the following factors could create such incentives for smuggling . 
(a) Foreign trade restrictions ： these included various forms of trade restrictions such as 
import tariffs and subsidies, export taxes and subsidies, and inqport & export quota • 
(b) Exchange Control: the exchange rate is fixed at a disequilibrium level，it could lead 
to the emergence of black market in foreign exchange. The difference between the 
official and black market rate creates a divergence between the price穷 of a good through 
legal and illegal channel. 
(c) State Trading Monopolies : a monopoly established by the government for trade in 
some commodity may set up price differential between the foreign and domestic 
markets, 
(d) Capital Transfer Restrictions : Illegal capital transfers aboard from less developed 
countries are not uncommon. Smuggling of goods maybe one source of financing such 
capital flows. 
For the domestic sector policies, the government imposes an indirect tax on the 
customers，which would create incentive for smuggling. In that case the price received by the 
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domestic producer of a good is higher than the corresponding world price. This created an 
incentive for smuggling-in of that good and also for tax evasion of domestically produced 
goods. However, if the tax was also imposed on the imported commodities, the smuggling 
may not exist depending on which tax evasion, domestic or foreign, was easier . 
(ii) The reduction in cost of Hong Kong /China Smuggling in 1990s 
, • . - . ‘ ‘ ’ .乂 ‘ . : • 
Table 3,1.1 Number of Passengers through the Border ofHK/China 
— HK Resident""“ 
Departures for Visitor Arrival 
YEAR China from China 
1983 — 5724418 121457 
1984 8036452 214854 
1985 10960747 308978 
1986 11867896 363479 
1987 14088643 484592 
1988 16306978 683606 
1989 15207079 730408 
1990 16688371 754346 
1991 19056776 875279 
1992 21460793 1149002 
1993 23195418 1732978 
1994 24798140 1943678 
Average Annual 14.26% 28.57% "j 
Growth _ _ _ _ L ： 1 
Source : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics —-— 
Unlike the commodities found in smuggling-out from Hong Kong to Mainland 
China, most of them are luxury goods. The commodities smuggled to Hong Kong in 1990s 
are daily consumed items - including meat，cigarette and diesel oil. The cause for the trade 
barrier of smuggling-in from China to Hong Kong is still within the category of Sheikh's 
analysis，say the state monopoly for the fresh meat in China, health regulation in Hong Kong, 
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the increased duty for tobacco& diesel oil in Hong Kong. Hie details would be discussed in 
followfaig sections. 
A special point required to be mentioned in smuggling-in phenomenon of HK is the 
number of Hong Kong residents and Mainland China visitors through the borders increasing 
significantly in the last decade. The average annual growth rate for Hong Kong residents 
departed for Mainland China increased at an average growth rate 14.26% and the visitors -
arrived from Mainland China was at the average annual growth rate 28.67%. This implies that 
t h e r e was a decrease in the cost of smuggling. In the case of fresh meat and cigarette 
smuggliag，this is quite important since the passengers passing the control point can easily 
conceal the unnoticed quantity of smuggled commodity. Besides the number of passengers 
crossing the border，the weight of cargo loaded and discharged by river trading vessels in 
1990s also increased approximately 2 to 5 times when compared with the figure in mid-1980s. 
This can be seen in Table 3.1.2 . 
Table 3.1.2 Inward & Outward Movements of Cargo by River Trading Vessels 
(Thousand tonnes) 
r = ^ 1985 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 
Discharged 6555 6 ^ 6 " " “ 1 6 1 7 2 
(11627)* 
L o a d e d 2600 4060 3262 4425 5385 — 1 0 2 5 5 13907 
(7706)* 
*Startingfrom 1993，river vessels have been redefined as all vessels operating exclusively 
within the river trade limits. To facilitate comparsion with 1993，figures for 1992 compiled 
according to the new definition are presented in brackets. 
Source : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 
A conclusion can be drawn from Hong Kong in the 90s experience is that in the face 
of increase in integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China, which experienced 
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significant economic and social development, there would be loss of automony for Hong 
Kong government to tackle its own problem. Tlie effect of any legislative and regulatory 
action to deal with new offences and heavier penalities can have only limited effect Instead of 
solving smoking and traffic congestion problems, the increase in duty brought tlie 
smuggling-in ofdiesel oil and cigarette .This will be discussed in the following sections. 
iu) Methodology for Detecting Smuggling Quantities 
As in the previous smuggling literature，the exact smuggling volume is only known 
t 0 smugglers instead of Census Department. For those supplies of illegal exchange coming 
from underinvoicing of exports from China to Hong Kong, the trade partner statisitcs 
technique may be able to reveal the discrepancies (Bhagwati, 1974). The illegal trade 
bypassing the custom departments of countries is difficult to detect statistically . 
Simkin (1974) has tried to measure the Indonesiaii smuggling trade by conqjarmg the 
volume of recorded exports of individual commodities witli formal export ” volumes • The 
'normal' export volumes are defined as the difference between estimates of production and 
domestic consumption and then to value any discrepancies at world prices. As suggested by 
Fung(1987) & Lai (1994), the construction of 'normal export' function requires the exact 
consumption data but such data was not available in statistics publication. Lai's estimation 
( 1 9 9 4 ) on the import demand of Hong Kong，was explained by the variable of real income 
and the relative price of the commodities, and then conq)are with recorded inaports data of 
Hong Kong to detect the smuggling-out potential to China. When tliere is discrepancy 
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between the predicted & official statistics and the later is greater，Lai believes that this is due 
to smuggling-out to China_ 
The eirq)kical analysis in this chapter is to estimate a consumption function of the 
commodities by Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) covering tke period from 1981 to 
1990. This function is used to predict what the consumption ought to be for the years after 
• ' ' . . v. . . . . . . . ‘ . — . . .. - . . • 
1990. Moreover, this function is only based on the assun^ption that there have been no serious 
smuggling activities in 1980s. The discrepancy between the predicted and the official statistics 
昶 believed to be smuggled in if the predicted value is greater and vice versa for the 
smuggling-out case, That discrepancy is also claimed to be due to the Hong Kong-China 
d o s s Border smuggling activity because the distances involved for illegal transport between 
Hong Kong & China are small and the risk can be minimised. In fact, the method for the 
detection of smuggling volume by constructing the consumer demand function would be 
more suitable for Hong Kong's case than for China . This is because the income of China 
citizens composes of significant portion of non-monetary subsidy and the GDP would be 
understated due to price distortion, e.g. price subsidy. 
The consunqjtion statistics are not available in Hong Kong. Variables from different 
sources are used to proxy the consuiiq)tion quantity of the tested commodities, for instance 
the number of swine slaughtered in abattoir as a proxy for the consun^tion of fresh spork and 
the quantity of petroleum product released from petroleum companies as a proxy for the 
consumption of auto & industrial -diesel oil. Some proxied variables may bring bias for the 
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consumption figure, say the retained import in the case offrozen pork. IHis is due to the fact 
that the retained import figures include the unsold stock. 
Hie computations of retained imports would be in terms of quantity instead ofvalue 
to aVoid distortions brought about by the valuation of imports. Retained in^orts are equal to 
total imports less imports for re-exports. However, imports for reexports are not recorded in 
L t r a d e statistics because it is not possible to ascertain at the point of importation if a particular 
imported good will be re-exported. A good may change hand many times before re-
exportation. Imports and re-exports can be estimated from re-exports by deducting the re-
export margin (the costs and profits of the re-exporter), and the re-export margin is estimated 
from survey data. Hiere is thus considerable uncertainity in the estimation of the value of 
retained imports. However, the quantity of imports for re-exports is the same as the quantity 
of re-exports excepting for time lag. Computing retained imports in quantity terms is thus 
more accurate. 
Following the aggregate import demand methodology of Tracy Mumy & Peter 
j Ginman (1976)，the consumption demand function is in the following form : 
Q = y ^ e " + S——--， — (3 .1 .1) 
where Q is the quantity of consumption, y is the real GNP，P is the consumer price level, e is 
the base of the natural logarithm，a is the constant intercept term，小 & S are the income and 
price elasticity coefficients, respectively, and s is the stochastic disturbance term assumed to 
be independently and normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. The point on 
the estimated function is the intersection of supply and demand curve. The supply is assumed 
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to be exogenous since Hong Kong is a small open economy. Hie demand function can thus be 
identified. For estimation purposes the model is linearized in parameter through a natural 
logarithmic transformation : 
ln(Q) = a + (|) In (y) + 8 In (P) + s (3.1.2) 
la considering the auotcorrelation of residual，the method of Cochrane & Orcutt 
AR(1) would be applied for remedial measures. Its rationale is demonstrated as follows : 
lnQt = a + (|)liiyt + 51iiPt+ St" —(3.1.3) 
st = pst-i + vt ——— — (3 . i -4) 
sn = InQt,i - a - ^ In yt.i - 8 InPt^ ( 3 . L 5 ) 
Substituting 3.1.4 & 3.1.5 into equation 3.1.3，the result would be : 
lnQt = a + (|) In yt + S In Pt +p( InQn - (X - (j) In yt-i- 5 In Pt-i )+ vt—-(3.1.6) 
Transforming 3.1.6 in the form in equation 3.1.7 under AR(1) measures : 
lnQ*t == a* + (j)lny*t + SlnP* t+v t (3.1.7) 
a* = a( l -p) 
lnQ*t = lnQt - p InQt-i 
In y*t 二 h yt - p In yn 
lnP*t = l n P t - p l n P n 
Apart from the estimation of predicted consumption volume，further test 
would be needed to check that whether the discrepancy between the actual and predicted 
volumes was statistically significant. Individual prediction approacli-prediction of an 
individual Y value corresponding to X was chosen and the formula would be as follows ： 
Y i - 戶 寸 p X t 十’而二. 
t r j L l ^ — 
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(3.2) Reasons & Details for Slaughtered and Frozen Pork smuggling 
(i) Background 
In Hong Kong，the distribution of fresh, live and frozen foodstuff imported from 
Mainland China, has been monopolised by Ng Fimg Hong Ltd . TTie Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation of Mainland China (MOFTEC) has adopted export quota 
— — administrative measures for the exportation of major fresh, live and frozen foodstuffs to Hong 
Kong from China since 1950s. The exportation of livestock (including pigs, cattle，goats and 
poultry ), aquatic products, frozen meat, fresh fruit & vegetables and preserved eggs requires 
quotas. Each year, MOFTEC reviews the annual quota of foodstuffs to be exported to Hong 
K o n g by taking the demand in Hong Kong and the supply from China into consideration. All 
Mainland China enterprises which intend to export the abovementioned have to possess the 
r e t e v a n t export quota, failing which the enterprise will be subject to fines. Ng Fung Hong Ltd. 
(NFH) has been appointed as the general agent in Hong Kong for the importation offresh, live 
and frozen foodstuJBfe from China under the Regulations on Quota Administration. The 
company is responsible for coordinating and administering the marketing and sales of those 
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products. Moreover，NFH is responsible for the co-ordination of import of fresh and live 
foodstuffs from Guangdong Province by Guangnan Holdings. 
Table 3.2.1 Number of Heads of Swine Imported 
Percentage 
< - S w i n e Imported 一> from China 
Total From China % 
1986 3085902 3019126 97.83 j 
1987 “ 2980957 2955383 99.14 
1 9 88 2923295 2920036 99.89 
1989 2821266 2821193 99.99 
1 9 9 0 2847821 2847641 99.99 
1991 2821423 2820605 99.97 
1 9 9 2 2792405 2791306 99.96 
1993 2605277 2598942 99.76 f 
1994 2569005 2568730 99.79 
^ \ II___HHH_II_II_III••HIMWMN IBUWJUILJIJIIJ n>«II_m•••••晒••丨曙 
Source : Hong KongTrade Statistics，variou issue 
The monopoly position of OTH in distributing the pork market could be evident from: 
(i) the directors of NFH in its prospectus believed that the livestock distributed by the Group 
represented approximately 94% ofthe livestock consumed in Hong Kong and approximately 
99% ofthe livestock sold in wholesale markets in Hong Kong in 1994 , when measured in 
sales volume. 
(ii)the figures in Table 3.2.1 showed that almost 99% ofthe swine iiiq)orted were from 
China, whicli could only be legally distributed by NEH • 
(iii)for the abattoir operation，there are five government authorised abattoirs operated in 
Hong Kong. Other than the abattoir in Cheung Sha Wan and Cheung Chau, which are 
government operated, the remaining three abattoirs are run by NFH and its associated 
conq>anies. NFH's prospectus showed that the livestock slaughtered in the Group's abattoir 
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accounted for 70% of the total number of livestock slaughtered at all authorised abattoirs in 
Hong Kong. 
ii) The Seizure of Pork (including slaughtered & frozen) 
Table 3.2.2 Statistics on cases with Frozen & Slaughtered Meat detected in 1993/95 
Year I Livestock-pig (No.) I Frozen /Slaughtered meat (kgs) 
- By S e a B y Land~~~ By Sea-pork only By Land -pork only 
1 9 9 2 0 "NM： WK 0 30,995 
1 9 9 3 169 1 7 1 , 3 5 2 9 2 , 7 2 9 141,567 57,826 
1 ^ ¾ " " ” 1 7 3 ^ 5 4 1 5 , 0 5 1 ""“108,975 7,794 
1 5 5 3 i l T " NM： W k 52,472 18,829 
Note : All pigs were detected by sea routes 
Source : Custom & Excise Department 
The cases of smuggling frozen pork were not unusual in 1980s but the maximum 
amount reported by C & E Department was in 1987, weighting 44525 kg , which was only 
around one third of the seized figure in 1993. Table 3.2.2 shows that the slaughtered meat was 
reported to be smuggled at sea by fisher boat，motorized sampan & speedboat. The Tolo 
Harbour, Tai 0，Castle Peak Bay and Tap Shek Kok were the paths commonly chosen. 
Recently, some fresh meat were smuggled by local passengers through the control point Those 
passengers would conceal the meat by using other commodities to cover it, putting in their bags 
or fastening it around their bodies. For the Jfrozen meat, container equipped with refrigerators 
would oftem be used and they were always seized in the public cargo working area. Referring 
to Table 3.2.3, approximately 90% of the seized quantities for the period 93-95 were frozen 
pork. Ho(1994) quotes his source of information as saying that Mainalnd China smugglers 
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exchanged fresh and frozen meat for consumer goods, which they lack foreign exchange to 
purchase in China. 
Moreover , tlie livestock swine were reported to be first seized in 1993 and all 
were smuggled at sea routes. One of the chosen routes being through Mirs Bay by motorized 
sang)an. In September 1995 , the pigs were found smuggled through coastal line by containers 
stored in Chinese Territory Vessel and then transported by container lonies to some illegal 
slaughter houses, some of them located in Yuen Long. Each container could transport 70 to 80 
pigs and the covers of those containers were specially removed so that the pigs could breathe • 
This was the reason that the transportation of those containers would be always at night. 
Table 3.2.3 Statisitcs oil Slaughtered and Frozen Pork Seized (in unit of kg) 
Year slaughtered frozen 
1993 45 ,452 153,941 
1994 5,914 110,855 
1995 240] 71,152 
Source : Custom and Excise Department，personal communication 
Note : The information provided by the officer of C & E Dept showed that 
79275kg and 25650kg of frozen pork were released back in 1993 & 94 respectively 
(iii)Reason for Slaughtered Pork Smuggling 
In Hong Kong, a number of government departments, including The Trade 
Department, the Agriculture and Fisheries Department, the Health Department，the Urban 
Services Department and the Regional Services Department, monitors and inspects fresh, live 
and frozen foodstuffs imported from Mainland China. Import licenses issued by the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Department are required for the in^port of livestock into Hong 
Kong and importers must produce the Animal Health Certificate issued by Mainland China. Of 
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course，smuggling can escape the control mentioned above. Why did smuggling became 
serious in 1990s ？ 
(a)Devaluation of RMB exchange rate 
Referring to the ratio of(D)/(A) in Table 3.2.4，the significant devaluation ofRMB's 
exchange rate after 1990 has widened the pork's price differential between Hong Kong & 
Mainland China. The devaluation has lowered the price in Mainland China when measured by 
Hong Kong Dollars, especially after 1994, and this cheaper price provided incentive to 
smuggle the pork from Mainland China to HK 
Theoretically, the price differential should attract more livestock swine 
exported to Hong Kong and the price gap between two locations would finally be eliminated. 
However, as shown in Table 3.2.1，there have been a gradual decline of number oflieads of 
swine imported since 1991 and the decline was substantial in 1993, which was opposite to the 
theoretical prediction .This may be explained by (a) the decrease in demand of Hong Kong 
citizens which resulted in reducing quotas allocated to Hong Kong or (b) the deliberate 
reduction of the supply of pigs by the wholesalers for seeking or at least securing tlie 
abnormal profit. The effect of the former reason would be the lowering of tlie price but the 
later would bring the opposite effect. 
The ratio of average wholesale price / inqjorted price (C)/(B) shown in Table 
3 2.4 is used as a proxy for the margin of the wholesaler，which decreased after 1991 and 
rebounded slightly in 1993, but was still significantly below that in 1988. This inq)lied that the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2.5 Average Nominal and Real Wholesale Price of Fresh Pork(Unit: HK$/kg) 
“ |<—Average Wholesale Price > 
Year Nomina丨 Price Real Price* 
1990 11.46 11-46 
1991 11.85 10.63 
1992 12.49 10.28 
1993 13.55 10.37 
1994 ^ 14.72 10-55 
Source : Nominal Price : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 
Real Price : Nominal price deflated by the ‘food，item of 
Composite Consumer Price Index 
— Regarding to the ratio of imported price/retail price in China (B)/(A) in 
Table3.2.4, both the official and swap rates ofRMB are used for the conversion of imported 
price for livestock swine as the swap rate is more market oriented. The result for this ratio in 
these two tables is broadly consistent but the result of using the swap rate is more smooth. It 
rose continually from 0.54 in 1991 to 1.03 in 1994 under the swap rate calculation. In 
consideration of NFH's vertical integration with its principal China National Cereals, Oils 
and Foodstuffs Import & Export Corporation in Mainland China, NFH may choose to book 
profits on the ledger of its principal in Mainland China by raising the profit for the whole group 
through the price of Chinese exports instead of by its wholesale margin. In light of the 
foregoing analysis, there was no surprise that the ratio C/Awas shown to be in a continuous 
increasing tendency in the 1990s, whicli inqjlied that NFH and its group started to restrict 
imports by manipulating the quota especially in 1993. 
In view of the real wholesale price in table 3.2.5，deflated by the 'food item' of 
the Composite Consumer Price Index, it decreased from 1990 to 1992 but rebounded in 1993 
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and thereafter. The increase in real wholesale price has induced local merchants to participate 
in the pig breeding business and provide more local swine. The local swine admitted for 
slaughter increased from 118296 in 1993 to 138496 in 1994 and 208365 in 1995 as shown in 
Table 3.2.6. 
Table 3.2.6 : Number of Heads of Swine Admitted for Slaughter and 
Estimated Population in Hong Kong 
Local swine Estimated average 
admitted for Annua丨 Pig Population 
Year slaughter in Hong Kong 
1985 593155 372000 
1986 563838 353100 
1987 594347 358100 
1988 565620 350000 
1989 487484 303800 
1990 368328 234400 
1991 277280 175300 
1992 149446 104200 
1993 118296 96900 
1994 138496 106700 
1995 208365 108600 
Source : Information Unit of Agriculture & Fisheries Department 
NFH has been the sole agent for foodstuflfe produced in Mainland China for 30 
years. Why would it exercise its the monopoly power in the 1990s but not before? There is a lack 
of volume of research on the pork market in Hong Kong. Only a child's prediction can be made 
which is subject to farther evidence : 
(a) the expected decline in number of local swine by NFH due to the pollution control 
legisilation in HK The Livestock Waste Control Scheme (LWCS) was first 
promulgated in 1987 to control livestock waste pollution (Le.from the keeping of 
pigs, chickens ducks, geese, pigeons or quail). The scheme is revised in 1994 after 
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consolation and Legislative controls are now provided by the Waste Disposal and 
the Public Health(Animals and Birds) Ordinance. 
A summary of the key offences and their maximum penalty is shown below: 
Legislation f ~ Offence [Maximum Penalty 
WDO* “ 
s 1 5 ( 2 ) Keeping off livestock in Livestock Waste First offence $100,000 
Prohibition Area Second offence $200，000 
Continuing(daily) $5,000 
s15A(2) “ Failure to comply with the requirements of Each offence $50 ,000 
the Waste Disposal (Livestock Waste) Continuing(daily) $5 ,000 
Regulations 
s15AA(2) Unauthorized keeping of livestock in Each offense $100,000 
Livestock Waste Restriction Areas Continuing(daily) $5,000 
s 1 5 G ( 6 ) Failure to comply with a statutory pollution First offense $50,000 
abatement notice Second offense $100,000 
v Continuing(daily) $10,000 
PH(A&B)(LLK) R+ “ ~ First offense $50,000 
reg.3(2) Keeping of Livestock Waste Control Areas Second offense $100,000 
without a Livestock Keeping License Continuing(daily) $1,000 
— Note : * Waste Disposal Ordnance ； 
+ Public Health(Animals & Birds)(Lic«ising off Livestock Keeping) Regulation 
Source: A Guide to the Livestock Waste Control Scheme, Environment Protection Dept 
Within tlie scheme ofLWCS，three areas are classified : 
(i)Control Area- livestock keeping in this area must be licensed by the Director of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (DAF) and must conqply with the Waste Disposal 
Regulations ； 
(ii)Prohibition Area-livestock keeping is banned in this area ； and 
(iii)Restriction Area-no new livestock keeping is allowedb in this area ； 
only existing livestock keeping activities either licensed by the DAF or 
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authorised by the Director of Environmental Protection (DEP) and 
complying with, the Waste Disposal Regulations are allowed, 
(b) the decentralisation of foreign trade reform in China-the size of the profit or 
losses was determined by the export earnings above planned level under the 
inqplementation of contract responsibility system after 1988. This provided an 
incentive for the enterprises engaging in export activities to maximise their profit 
by various means. 
(iv)Empirical Analysis of Slaughtered Pork 
Smuggling of livestock into Hong Kong was quite rare until 1993 as 
mentioned before. The assumption of no serious smuggling for the estimation exercise is 
valid for the liverstock swine. The dependant variable is the iicqported swine plus the number 
of local swine admitted for slaughter. For adjusting the autocorrelation, the consumption 
function for the livestock swine under AR(1) is estimated : 
LNFRESH* 二 8.5895 - 0.242 LNPRSH* + 0.3160 LNGDP* - 0.0314DUM*—(3.2.1) 
t 二（11.431) (-2.773) (3.660) (-4.149) 
Adjusted R **2 = 0.5456 D.W.Statistics : 1.790 N=40 
8t = 0.20628 t.i + vt 
t = (1.269) 
LNFRESH* = LNFRESHT - 0.2062 LNFRSKU 
LNPRSH* = LNPRSHT - 0.2062 L N P R S H ^ 
LNGDP* = LNGDPT - 0.2062LNGDPT.I 
L N D U M * = LMDUMT - 0.2062LNDUMT .1 
FRESH : quarterly figure of local swine admitted for slaughter plus the number of swine imported 
from China (unit in number of heads) 
(Source : Imported swine figure from China is found in Hong Kong Trade Statistics Monthly 
Digest -Import. The data of local swines admitted for slaughtered are provided by the Information 
Officer of Agriculture and Fisheries Dqjt.) 
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PRSH: Average quarterly price for the best cut pork 
(Source : Consumer Price Index Report，various issue) 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product，At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1995) 
DUM:This design followed Mok (Summer 1996). The dummy is time tread variable which is coded 0 
for the period 1981- 1984 and 1,2,3 .....,6 for the years 1985 -1990 . Year 1985 is chosoi as the 
starting point for the dummy variable because China started its substantial trade reform in late 1984. 
Referring to equation (3.2.1)，the t ratio for the regression coefficients of eacli 
explanatory variable is greater than the critical t-statistics at 5% levels of significance . The 
result manifested in equation showed that the consumption of fresh swine is determined by 
GDP and the retail price. The sign of the coefficient is the same as expected, positive for 
GDP but negative for the price. The time trend is -3% after 1985. For predicting the 
consumption of slaughtered swine covering the period from 1st quarter 1991 to 4th quarter 
1995, equation (3.2.1) is used to calculate the estimated volume. Wlien the ratio 
(predicted-actual)/standard error is greater than the t ratio at pre-determined levels of 
significance, the discrepancy between the official statistics and predicted consumption 
volume is believed to be significant. Meanwhile, the predicted volume should be theoretically 
greater than the actual volume since the inqjort smuggling is believed to exist in those tested 
commodities. The critical t-ratio in one-tailed test for 5% & 10% level of confidence are 
found to be 1.697 & 1.310. 
The results are shown in Table 3.2.7，the t ratio being greater than the critical 
level for 5% and 10% level of confidence is in the quarters before 1994 and an alternate 
pattern is displayed - one significant quarter following an insignificant one in the previous 
quarter. Only in the 3rd & 4th quarter of 1993 show the continuously significant t ratios. 
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Most of t ratio in quarters after 1994 are statistically insignificant except in the 4th quarter 
o f l 9 9 4 & 1995. 
Table 3.2.7 Discrepancies between Published & Predicted Volume of 
Slaughtered Swine 
y ^ Pred-Pub St-Enror t-ratio 
1991- 0.052 0.040 1.301 
-0.027 0.038 -0.702 
-0.061 0.038 -1.597 
0.052 0.038 1.380* 
“ 1992 0 4 2 7 0.044~~~9.795** 
— -0.376 0.041 -9.108** 
0.074 0.040 1.879** 
0.043 0.040 1.090 
1993 -0.007 0.048 -0.157 . 
0.055 0.044 1.234 
0.067 0.043 1.549* 
0.108 0.042 2.546** 
1994 0.015 0.049 0.304 
0.035 0.047 0.738 
-0.007 0.046 -0.158 
0.066 0.047 1.400* 
1995 -0.010 0.054 -0.178 
0.009 0.052 0.168 
0.047 0.050 0.937 
0.079 0.050 1.582* 
* Significant at 10% level of confidence in one tailed test 
** Significant at 5% level of confidence in one tailed test 
For smoothing the alternative pattern in Table 3.2.7 , an regression 
based on annual data for the period 1971-90 is done . Due to the autocorrelation 
error, the regression under AR(1) is shown in equation (3.2.2). 
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LNFRESHH* 二 6.033 - 0.254LNPRSfflI*+0.4226 LNGDP*- 0.0381DUM* (3.2.2)2 
t =(15.053) (-3.441) (6.146) (-5.585) 
Adjusted R **2 = 0.9013 D.W.Statistics : 1.749 N=20 
8 t = 0 . 4 2 1 4 8 t.i +V t 
t = (1.9011) 
L N F R E S H E * = LNFRESHET - 0.4214 L N F R S H U ^ 
LNPRSHH* = LNPRSHHT - 0.4214 LNPRSHHT-I 
LNGDPn* = LNGDHIt _ 0.4214LNGDPnt.i 
L N D U M * = LMDUMT - 0 .4214LNDUH-1 
FRESH : Annual figure of swines slaughtered in both urban & rural abattiors. 
(Source : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
PRSHII: Annual average price for the best cut pork 
(Source : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product, At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1995) 
DUM'This design followed Mok (Summer 1996). The dummy is time trend variable which is coded 0 
for the period 1981- 1984 and 1,2,3 .....,6 for the years 1985 -1990 . Year 1985 is chosen as the 
starting point for the dummy variable because China started its substantial trade reform in latel984. 
The predicted aimual figure is greater than published statistics within all sample years 
and the result of annual discrepancies is shown in Table 3.2.8 . The critical t value for the 
degree of freedom 14 in one tailed 10% level of confidence is 1.345 and only the t ratio for 
1993 i s greater than this critical point , whicli is consistent with tlie result of quarterly 
analysis. Wlien referring to the pattern of t ratio in Table 3.2.7 & 3.2.8 , the insignificant t 
2 The population variable has been included in the r^ression with dependent variable as per capita 
consumption and the income in the explanatory variable as per capita income. The quarterly and annual result 
are not consistait • In the quarterly exercise, the years of 1993 and thereafter show significant discrepancies 
f o r the predicted result. For the annual exercise, there is no statistical significance for the discrq)ancies but the 
greatest discrqjanaes is still in 1993. 
The inconsistoicy of the quarterly and annual result is partly due to the non-availability of the first & 
third quarter's population data for the period 1981-1985. In my econom^ric exercise, these data are obtained 
by the average of the one quarter before and after of that predicted quarter. 
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ratio after 1993 might be due to the increase of the heads of local swine admitted for 
slau^iter，which increased from 118,296 in 1993 to 138496 in 1994 and 208365 in 1995. 
Table 3.2.8 Discrepancies between the Published & Predicted Volume 
of Slaughtered Swine (in annual basis) 
|YEAR Pred-Pub St-Error t-ratio 
1991 0.006 0 .030 0 .207 
1992 0 .015 0.032 0.461 
1993 0 .049 0 .035 1.404 木 
1994 0 .004 0 .038 0 .097 
1 9 9 5 0.011 0 042 0.261 
* Significant at 10% level of confidence in one tailed test 
Besides checking the significance of discrepancies，the estimated smuggling 
volume and the percentage of that volume compared with the actual quantity of swine 
^ slaughtered in abattoir are shown in Table3.2.9. The percentage of smuggling quantity in 
1993 with significant discrepancies was 5.01% for the quantity slaughtered in abattoir. 
Table 3.2.9 Estimated Smuggling Quantities of Fresh pork and Its Share (in %) of 
the Quantity Slaughtered in Abattoir 
(Unit in Number of Heads of Swine) 
Estimated % compared with 
Smuggling swines slaughtered 
Quantity* in abattoir 
1991 19022 0 .62% 
1992 43682 1.49% 
1993 136328 5 .01% 
1994 9901 0 .37% 
1995 28205 1.08% 
Note: * Smuggling quantity was the differoice betweoi the predicted quantity based on 
equation 3.2.2 and the actual quantity of swines slaughtered in abattoir 
Source : The number of swines slaughtered in abattoir - Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 
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v) Reason for Smuggling of Frozen Pork 
The prospectus of Ng Fung Hong Ltd. has shown that in terms of weight，the 
Directors believed that the frozen meat distributed by the Group representing 31 % of the total 
consumption of frozen meat in Hong Kong in 1994 . The rest of frozen meat are mostly 
imported from Brazil. Tariff Department of Customs General Admininstratioii of the People's 
Republic of China(PRC)(1996) shows that the export license has to be issued by an Accredited 
Office based in Guangzhou or Shenzhen on fresh chilled or frozen meat ( including beef； pork, 
chicken，ducks and geese ) for export by land to Hong Kong and Macau. Wang (1994) states 
tliat the export license for sea transport is based on the quotas allocated to different regions of 
Mainland China. 
Import license for the frozen meat and frozen poultry from China can be obtained 
from Trade Department only when the _ o r t e r s provide the department with the relevant 
Inspection Certificate issued by the authority of the People's Republic of China 
(Source:Prospectus ofNFH) • As the greater integration between Hong Kong and China in the 
last decade brought the increase in the number of passengers crossing through the border, this 
reduction in cost of smuggling enables the smugglers to escape the quota and certificate control 
easily. 
(vi) Empirical Analysis for Frozen pork 
Noting the information from officers of Customs & Excise Department , 
there have been some seized cases of frozen pork between 1985 and 1989 -(1985: 15,000 
kg , 1986 : 22,214kg，1987:44,525kg，1988 : 1,300kg & 1989: 2,000kg). The most 
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serious one were in 1986 & 1987 and the maximum number of seized case was 10 in 1986 • 
However these figures were small when co吨aring with 54 cases & 153491kg in 1993 and 
21 cases &110855kg in 1994. Due to the comparatively insignificant smuggling activities in 
1980s, the assumption of negligible smuggling activities before 1990 would still be valid 
f o r this commodity. For the adjustment of autocorrelation，the consumption demand 
function of frozen & chilled pork under AR(1) is : 
LNFROZ*= 8.516 + 0.4179LNGDP* — (3.2.3)3 
t= (4.552) (1.913) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.4441 Durbin-Watson Statistics = 2.414 N=35 
8t = 0.2628b t.i + vt 
t二 (1.915) 
LNFROZ* = LNFROZT - 0.2628 L N F R S H ^ 
LNGDP* 二 LNGDPT - 0.2628LNGDPT.I 
FROZ- The quantity of fresh chilled or frozoi meat of swine imported (in unit of kg) minus the 
quantity re-exported from Hong Kong 
(Source : Hong Kong Trade Statistics Monthly Digest- Import，Export & Re-export, various 
issue) 
GDP- Real Gross Domestic Product, At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-95) 
Referring to equation(3.2.3), the variable LNGDP was individually 
significant at 10% levels of significance. For checking the discrepancies based on the 
Equation (3.2.3), the t-ratio almost follows the same fluctuation as that of slaughtered 
swine meat. Referring to Table 3.2.10，the discrepancies between the predicted and the 
official statistics volume are found to be positive in the period of post 1990s whicli inqjlies 
that there was inqjort smuggling to Hong Kong within that period. The t ratio also displays 
3 There is no absolute price offroz«i pork available in the published statistics. The factor of “frozoi meat" in 
consumer price index has beai used for the empirical exercise but the coefficioit was a positive sign , whidi 
was not satisfactory. 
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an alternative significant pattern before the third quarter of 1992, an insignificant t ratio in 
one quarter followed by a significant one in the previous quarter. Sucli phenomenon is 
believed to be due to the time lag effect. The t ratio is significant continuously at 5% levels 
of significance from 3rd quarter 92 up to 2nd quarter 93. 
Table3.2.10 Discrepancies between Published & Predicted Volume 
of Frozen & Chilled Pork 
Pred-Pab St-error t-ratjo 
1991 1st quarter 0JL36~~~0201 0678 
2nd quarter -0.198 _ 0.204 -0.973 
3rd quarter -0.209 0.209 -1.000 
4th quarter 0.308 0.208 1.481 
1992 1st quarter 0 4 8 4 0 2 0 3 2.383* 
2nd quarter -0.407 0.206 -1.975* 
3rd quarter 0.714 0.212 3.366* 
4th quarter 0.390 0.211 1.852* 
1993 1st quarter 0 5 8 2 0 2 0 5 2.838* 
2nd quarter 0.538 0.209 2.578* 
3rd quarter 0.148 0.216 0.685 
4th quarter 0.268 0.214 1.255 
1994 1st quarter -0.135 0.208 -0.651 
2nd quarter 0.042 0.211 0.197 
3rd quarter 0.069 0.218 0.316 
4th quarter -0.347 0.217 -1.601 
1995 1st quarter -0.122 0.211 -0.577 
2nd quarter 0.046 0.214 0.214 
3rd quarter 0.156 0.221 0.709 
4th quarter -0.028 0.219 -0.129 
Note : Figure with * -1 ratio was greater than critical value in 5% level of confidence 
Figure with **-t ratio was greater than critical value in 10% level of confid^ice 
Besides checking the significance of discrepancies, the estimated smuggling 
volume and its percentage compared with the retained import are shown in Table3.2.11. 
Even though the econometric exercise is in a quarterly basis, the grouping of four 
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quarters figure into an annual one is used for comparison. The percentage of smuggling 
quantity in 1992 & 93 , which are with significant discrepancies, were 26% & 43% of the 
retained import. The result of the smuggled quantity being 40% of the retained inqjort 
seems not to be conceivable and this may be due to the bias of using retained in^port as a 
proxy for the consumption figure，which includes the unsold stock. 
Table 3.2.11 Estimated Smuggling Quantities of Frozen Pork and Its Share (in % ) 
of the Retained Import 
l y i ^ Estimated * 
Smuggling Volume retained import 
kilogram 
1991 -640879 ~ -1.03% 
-1992 11961578 25.69% 
1 9 9 3 16806796 43.68% 
1 9 9 4 -7199357 -10.09% 
1 9 9 5 475530 0.69% 
Note: * Smu^ling quantity was the difFeroice beiweai the predicted quantity based on equation 3.2.3 
and the quantity of retained import 
The quantity of retained import was the substraction of re-export from import of frozen pork 
Source : Hong Kong Trade Statistics Monthly Digest 
3.3) Reasons & Details for Cigarette Smuggling 
(I) Background 
Cigarette was the commodity mainly smuggled out of Hong Kong to China in 
late 1980s. Vagg (1991) quoted a press released from Xinhua News Agency in 1990 which 
estimated that of all the cigarettes entering PRC in 1989，84 % had been smuggled in. He 
attributed the serious smuggling activities to the high i ^ o r t dutied levied by Chinese authorities 
_ about $1,500 on a case of Western cigarettes ( a case containing 50 200-cigarette cartons). 
Additionally, Vagg also found that the Chittese duty on cigarettes in the late 1980s was in the 
region of 30-50 per cent of the duty-free price in Hong Kong. 
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Table 3.3.1 • Ad Valorem Import Duty Rate for Tobacco manufactures in PRC 
(including cigarette & cigar) 
YEAR ~ 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 
Import Duty Rate 
-Preferential 150% 150% 150% 
.Ordinary 180% 180% 180% 
Source : Customs Duty of PRC Policy, Regulation，Practice, Tariff various issue 
The massive avoidence of high duties to feed the increase of demand for 
consumer items，which is due to rising of living standard brought by the success ofthe launch 
0 f economic reform, is a predictable consequencies. Wliy would the bi- directional smuggling 
activites occur in 1990s ？ — 
(ii) Reason for smuggling-in of cigarette 
Table 3.3.2 : Duty Rate for Cigarette 
Growth over 
Duty Rate previous year 
Fiscal Year $/1000 sticks % 
1987/88 165.00 
1988/89 175.00 6.06 
1989/90 190.00 8.57 
1990/91 240.00 26.32 
1991/92 480.00 1 0 0 . 0 0 
1992/93 530.00 10.42 
1993/94 580.00 9.43 
1994/95 580.00 0.00 
1995/96 626.00 7 .93 
1996/97 682.00 8^5 
Source : Speech by the Financial Secretary, moving the Second 
Reading ofthe Appropriation Bill, various issue 
In a peculiar twist to the smuggling stories，there was a struggle between HK 
Government and the tobacco industries regarding the duty rate of cigarettes. The Financial 
Secretary, in the 1991/1992 Budget Speech, proposed an increase of 200% in the rate of duty 
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for the health reason but was later forced to reduce it due to sustained lobbying from the tobacco 
industry and opposition from smokers. Finally, an increase of 100% was approved and the 
figure was shown in Table 3.3.2 . 
However, the increased duty led to an increase in the number of Hong Kong 
residents who shuttled back and forth between Lo Wu and Shenzhen (the Hong Kong and China 
border crossing-points) several times a day and carried the cigarttes in excess of the duty- free 
allowance from China. This definitely reduced the revenue from tobacco duty. A preliminary 
review of the change of the number of smokers and the full duty paid cigarettes can be referred to 
Table 3.3.3. 
Table 3.3.3. The Change of Number of Daily Smokers & Duty Paid Cigarettes in 1990s 
Year No of smokers (000) Duty paid Cigarette 
incl. daily & occasion (In Thousands) 
T988 847^5 6831482 
1990 811.1 6940232 
-1993 786.2 4168864 
Average annual growth rate 
1988-93 -1-49%1 - ^ 1 % 
1988-90 "2.17% Q-7 9 % 
T990^93 _0.62%丨 -9.69% 丨 
Source : Number of smokers -Social Data collected by General Houshold Survey Special 
Topic Report No. 11 
Duty paid cigarette - Customs & Excise Department, Personal Communication 
The figures in Table3.3.3 show that the duty paid cigarette decreased at a rate 
within the sample period of 1988-93 faster than the number of smokers - the average annual 
growth rate for daily smokers was just - 1.49%, and the corresponding rate for the duty paid 
I . ^ 
i cigarette was up to -9.41% • The average rate of duty paid cigarette increased at 0.79% within % 
the period of 1988-90 and the corresponding growth rate of the number of daily smokers was 
I 
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_2.17%. It showed that the reduction of the consunq)tion of cigarette was far greater than the 
decline in number of daily smokers. Even though the number of cigarette consumed by each 
smoker was significantly varied, the decrease in the number of duty paid cigarette was so large 
that it may not be solely attributed to the deduction of the number of daily smokers. Instead， 
smuggling brought by the high duty rate is deemed to play a significant role. 
Table3.3.4 . Collected Tobacco Duties in Hong Kong 
[Year [1990/91 [1991/92 11992/93 [1993/94 11994/95 11995/961 
I ($000) 1670231 2264738! 2516699! 2099279! 2538061 26317�§ | 
Source : Director of Accounting Services Report _ Various Issue 
Comparing the duties for tobacco collected within the fiscal year 93/94 shown in 
Table 3.3.4 to those for 1992/93 & 1994/95, the figure in 1993/94 was the smallest. The 
Financial Secretary, The Honorable Sir Hamish Maclead, in his 1994/95 Budget Speech has 
explained that the fall was due to the increased smuggling of the cheaper, contraband cigarette 
instead of the discouragement of smoking under the high duty rate. He then decided to maintain 
the tobacco duty rate at 94/95 without any further increase, since he feared that any further 
increase in the rate of duty would only lead to more smuggling. For tackling smuggling 
problems, he proposed to establish a 40-strong task force in the Customs & Excise Department 
to attack smuggling syndicates. He also approved a grant of $7.5 million to be spent on anti-
smoking campaigns and research. The effectiveness of the strong task force was reported by the 
Financial Secretary in 95/96 Budget Speech-the revenue from duty paid cigarette increased by 
28% in the first nine months of 94/95 financial year , which was shown in Table 3.3.4. and the 
black market price of cigarette increased markedly. 
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Table 3.3.5 Employed Daily Smokers by Occupation 
Occupation No. /0 
('000) 
Managers and administrators 5 M _ 1 0 . 0 % 
Professionals and associate professionals ——^^ 
Clerks ^ M 5 ， 
Service workers and shop sales workers — 1 0 4 5 _ 1 9 4 % 
Craft & Related workers and plant & machine 210.3 39.1% 
operators & assemblers 
Elementary occupations _ _ 1 6 . 7 % 
Others M _ 
5 3 8
.
Q ( ) 丨 
Source : Social Data collected by General Houshold Survey Special Topic Report No. 11 
Bhagwati's model assumes that each individual has the same taste and the 
same income level and the issue of income distribution is not considered. Cigarette smuggling 
in Hong Kong demonstrates that smuggling can lead to welfare improvement for the less 
well-off population even though at society's cost-loss of state revenue. Referring to 
Ho(1994) and my personal interview with Customs & Excise officer，the price of smuggled 
cigarette was around one halfofthe market price of legitimate cigarettes . Theoretically, the 
poor can bear more time cost than the rich to search for the smuggled cigarette's sellers. Thus 
the cheaper smuggled cigarette provide the poor more benefits. Table 3.3.5 shows that 
smokers in Hong Kong tend to be less educated. Smuggling of cigarette thus redistribute 
income to the poor. This is why Ho (1994) believes that the general public may not favour the 
stringent penalty or vigorous enforcement. The majority of smokers, who are not well 
educated and do not study Bhagwati's model, may prioritize their interests of cheaper 
smuggled cigarettes above the social cost to the society，say loss of duty revenue. Similiar to 
the Tobias(1982) analysis of the smuggling situation in Grenada , the lower class purchased 
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the cheaper cigarettes from smugglers and regarded the illegal trade activities as returning the 
exploited profits from the rich to the poor. 
(iu)Seizure of Cigarette 
The seizure figure of smuggling-out cigarettes is shown in Table 3.3.6. Only the 
information for the years from 1992-1995 is provided because the classification in Table3.3.6 is 
not available for year&before 1991. Meanwhile, Table 3.3.6 provides the following information: 
(a) For smuggling - in cases 
The seizure cigarettes by quantites in 1993 was 2.87 times of 1992 and the figure 
continuously increased to 88,743,794 sticks in 1995，which was 1.67 times of that in 1993. The 
confiscated goods for the smuggling - in cases were discovered from various sources. The most 
important source was surveillance /patrol on retail outlets. The scale of smuggling - in cases for 
the 4 years period was relatively small. This was supported by thousands of seizure cases (i) for 
passengers & vehicles processing at Control Ports & Land Border and (ii) abandoned by 
incoming passengers / cargo who did not fulfil the obligation of duty payment • In fact, these 
two sources of smuggling-in were largely due to the reduction of smuggling cost - the number of 
passengers through the borders significantly increased in the last decade as shown in Table 3.1.1. 
Customs & Excise Department's officers also pointed that cigarettes have been successfully 
smuggled^in by legally in^porting cigarettes from overseas through ocean going vessels and 
storing them in a bonded warehouse. No duty need to be paid as cigarettes were falsely declared 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3.7 • The ratio of Seized Cigarette Smuggled into HK to Retained Imports 
IT Fiscal Year 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 
# Percentage of 
Cigarettes seized 
over Retained Import 0.20% 0.72% 5.68% 2.56% 
Source : #The rqjly made by Secr^ary for Treasury to Ms. Selina Chow in the Legislative 
Council Meeting held on 15 Nov 1995 
(b)For smuggling - out cases 
SmuggTers may choose various method for smuggling of cigarettes. According to 
the information given by the officers of Customs & Excise Department, the most common 
means is to conceal cigarettes by other commodities, e.g. furniture and then to transport them 
by sampans, lorries or containers • 
The increase in the number of smuggling _ in cases did not represent that there 
was the diminution of smuggling-out of cigarettes. Referring to Table 3.3.8, significant 
cigarette seizure cases after 1994 were mostly classified as exports orre-e:q)orts. However, the 
classification may not be as described beacuse there maybe false declaration of exports and 
re-exports. The cigarettes may be sent back to Hong Kong after reaching the public water. As 
mentioned in (1)，the increase in the demand of foreign inqjorted cigarettes among PRC 
citizens and the high in^ort duty levied are the two main reasons for smuggling-in cigarettes to 
Mainland China. Regarding the empircial analysis from Table 3.3.6，the seized sticks related to 
smuggling decreased from 24,539,800 in 1992 to 9,300,000 in 1993 and was followed by an 
increase, up to 234,810,000 in 1995, which was 9.5 times of that in 1992. Even though the 
number of smuggling-out cases were usually less than 10，the seized quantity exceeded that of 
smuggling-in cases. Among those 4 san^le years except 1993，the number of sticks seized in 
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smuggling-out cases were greater than the smuggling-in and the seized cases were all through 
container on board. This might reflect that the smuggling-out activities were ususally in a large 
scale • 
Table 3.3.8 The Significant Cigarette Seized Cases from Customs & Excises Pept 
] ~ Duty Potential for 
Seized Cigarette Value Cigarette Seized 
Date Nature (in million sticks) (in million $HK) (in million $HK) 
01/02/94 Export 100.00 110.00 57.00 
22/05/95 Re-export 235.00 282.00 147.00 
01/02/96 Import 68.00 82.00 4 3 0 0 
14/06/96 Re-export 20.00 2 0 . 0 0 13.60 
2 9 / 0 6 / 9 6 Re-export 4 6 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 一 3 2 . 0 0 
09/08/96 Re-export 96.90 126.00 66.10 
04/09/96 Import 9.50 12.80 6.50 
01/11/96 Re-export 52.00 65.00 36.00 
18/11/96 Re-export 16.60 20.40 11.30 
24/03/97 Import 24.00 31.00 1 7 4 0 
T o t a l 668.00 809.20 429.90 
.Source : Ming Pao 25 March 97 
In November 1996，the Customs & Excise Department seized two containers 
concealing 16,600,000 sticks worth HK$20,000,000. They were covered up by potato chips, 
which came from Singapore and intended to re-export to Fujan . The seized cigarettes were 
manufactured in Y皿an with the brand name of ^ 丄 ” (Huangtashan). Ming Pao dated 
20/11/96 quoted the source from officers of Customs & Excise Department as saying that the 
China manufactured cigarettes were e?q)orted to the bonded area of foreign countries and then 
indirectly re-exported back to Mainland China through Hong Kong. The potential duty evaded 
for the seized cigarette was estimated to be around HK$11,500,000 should the smugglers be 
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smugglers be successful. It appears that there is some limitation for local sale of some brand of 
PRC manufactured cigarette. Hence，the local demand can only be satisfied by illegal channel. 
To sum up , an upsurge of smuggling-in cigarette in 1990s was probably related 
t 0 Hong Kong government's increase in duty rate of tobacco for the public health reason . 
This policy elicited more smuggling for sales at a lower price, which competed with the 
commodities through the legal channeL As a consequence, Hong Kong Government has put 
mucli effort to tackle this by the establishment of a task force. The balance of deterrant effect 
and the smuggling incentive should be an important factor to be considered by the policy maker 
in deciding the duty rate for dutiable commodities thereafter. Meanwhile, the seized quantity for 
smuggling-out cases increased except for the year 1993. 
(iv) Empirical Analysis 
Smuggling of cigarette was a bi-directional activity. This commodity was 
always reported by the press to be smuggled outwards to Mainland China in late 1980s, by a 
method through HK customs by reporting them as other commodities on importation and 
thea re-exporting them by the same faked classification to the mainland China. The retained 
import statistics would not be affected. 
The local consunqjtion figure of cigarette is not available. Even though the 
retained import of cigarette can be traced from published trade statistics, it cannot be 
integrated with local production statistics since they are in different unit of measurement. 
Unfortunately，the complete record of duty paid cigarette is also absent in Customs & 
Excise Department. This is because the duty for local produced cigarette before 25 Nov 
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1987 was levied on the production material - tobacco in unit of kg instead of in 1000 sticks 
under the present practice. The tobacco consun^tion (including cigarettes , cigars and cut-
tobacco )under the private consun^tion expenditure of GDP (at 1990 constant price ) is 
chosen as dependent variable. Consumer expenditure on any particular commodity is 
estimated from the two principal sources of supply-local production and retained inqjorts 
and then the unsold inventories have to be adjusted. Since the commodities have to pass 
through distributive channels (Le.wholesalers and retailers) before they ultimately reach final 
consumers and may be temporarily held as inventories. For adjusting the autocorrelation， 
AR(1) method is used and the result is shown in equation (3.3.1). 
LNTOB# 二 0.5096 _ 0.8786 LNPRCIG# (3.3.1) 
t 二（6.4206) (4.356) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.7534 Durbin-Watson Statistics- 1.774 n=l l 
The correlation of residual 
8t = 0 . 9 5 6 3 � + v t 
t = (9.6775) 
L N T O B # = LNTOBT - 0 .9563LNTOB T . I 
L N P R C I G # = LNPRCIGT - 0 .9563 LNPRCIGT . I 
TOB: The item of tobacco within the composition of Private 
Consumption Expaiditure in GDP(at constant 1990 market price) 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1996) 
PRCIG : Price index for Tobacxx) and related product 
(Source : Consumer Price Index Rq^ort，various issue ) 
(Formula : Calculated by the movemait of "tobacco & related product" factor # in Consumer 
Price Index (A)) 
# Note : the factor was renamed as Cigar^te from March 1991 . 
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Table3.3.9 Discrepancies between the Published & Predicted Volume 
of Tobacco (Annual Analysis) 
Year Pred- Pub St-error t-ratio 
“ 1991 0.009 0.116 0.08 
1992 -0.046 0.089 -0.52 
1993 0.208 0.090 2.33 
1994 0.002 0.089 0.02 
The result of the dispreancies in Table 3.3.9 shows that only the year 1993 is 
with positive & significant discrepancy. This is consistent with tke lowest tobacco duty 
collection in the fiscal year 93/94 shown on Table 3.3.4. 
Table 3.3.10 Estimated Tobacco Smuggling Quantities and its Share (in % )of 
the Published Consumption 
(Unit: in HKSMiHion at 1990 constant price) ^ 
Estimated % of tobacco in 
Year Smuggling Value published consumption 
199lT 20 0.90% 
1992 -102 -4.50% 
1993 417 23.12% 
1994 -4 -0.20% 
Note: * Smuggling quantity is the differoice betweoi the predicted quantity based on equation 3.3.1 and 
the published quantity of consumption 
The published quantity of consumption was the tobacco componait under the private consumption of 
GDP (at 1990 constant price) 
Source : Quarterly Estimate of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1996 
Besides checking the significance of discrepancies , the estimated smuggling 
volume and its percentage when compared with the tobacco conqjonent under the private 
consun^ption of GDP are shown in Table3.3.10. The percentage of smuggling quantity in 93 
with significant discrepancies was 23.12% of the published consunqjtion. When using the 
published tobacco duty HK$2,099 million of fiscal year 93/94 to proxy the annual duty collected 
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collected for the calendar year 1993，the duty evaded for the year 1993 was roughly HKS485 
million (HK$2,099*23.12%). 
3.4) Reasons& Details for Diesel Oil Smuggling 
(i) The demand of diesel oil in China 
The diesel oil use in Hong Kong can be boardly divided into two types -
automobile diesel oil(ADO) and industrial diesel oil (EDO). The users of ADO, which is taxed， 
are mainly drivers of taxi，public buses, dump trucks & container tracks. Industrial diesel oil is 
duty exempted and it is the cheapest oil in the territory. The official Hong Kong trade statistics 
publication shows that the bulk of diesel oil is imported from Singapore; 90% of HK's re-
exports of diesel oil is destined to China. 
The demand of diesel oil in China was continuously increasing in the late 1980s 
after the launch of the economic reform. Referring to the data from Statistical Yearbook of 
China, the total consumption of diesel oil increased from 19,394,000 ton in 1985 to 26,917,000 
ton in 1990, with an annual growth rate of 6.8%. Meanwhile，the total diesel oil consun^pdon 
was 38,030,100 ton in 1994, which was 1.4 times of that in 1990，and the average annual growth 
rate was 9% during these 5 years. As shown in Table 3.4.1，the total number of civic motor 
vehicles had an annual average growth rate of 14% from 1991 to 1995, whereas it was 11% for 
the period 1985-90. The number of motor vehicle for cargo still maintained at 10% annual 
growth duiing 1991-95. Besides, the vehicles for carrying passenger grew more rapidly at 23%. 
In fact, China is a country with limited crude oil supply. Zhang(1994) points out 
that the crude oil resources are serious constrained in China and the investment elasticity 
(percentage change of output/percentage change of investment) is progressively reduced. Due to 
68 
the limited supply of crude oil and the strong demand of petroleum product, the only remedy is 
to adjust the structure of the production of petroleum product. Zhang quoted his source as 
saying Hiat, in the situation of limited supply of crude oil，the proportion of Gasoline oil: Diesel 
oil: Kerosene oil: Fuel oil in 1980 was 16.7: 28.3: 6.2: 48.7 but in 1990 was 25.7: 30.9: 4.6: 
38 7 xhe development of mechanical operation in agriculture industry and transportation & 
communication raised tke demand of diesel oil & gasoline oil. Their production proportions 
increased while the proportions of kerosene oil & fiiel oil decreased. However, Zhang 
concluded that the production of crude oil，diesel oil & gasoline were still lagging behind their 
demand by around 300 million ton in 1993 & predicted that the gap would rise to 500 million ton 
in 1994. Thirled to a decrease in the export of these products and an increase in inqjort. 
Table 3.4.1 : Number of Civil Motor Vehicles in China 
* Unit in number of motor vehicles 
一 Total Civil Including � -Change over previous year -> 
Year Motor Vehicle For Cargo For Passenger 
� (B) (C) (A) (B) ( O 
~ % % % ~ ~ 
1985 321.12 223.2 79.45 
-1990 551.36 368.48 162.19 
1991 606.11 398.62 185.24 9.93 8.18 14.21 
1 9 9 2 691.74 441.45 226.16 14.13 10.74 22.09 
j 1 9 9 3 817.58 501.00 285.98 18.19 13.49 26.45 
1994 941.95 560.33 349.74 15.21 11.84 22.30 
1995 1040.00 585.46 417.90 10.41 4.48 19.49 
Average annual g r o w t h 1 9 8 5 - 9 0 11.42 10.55 15.34 
1991-95 14.45 10.09 22.56 
Source : Yearbook of China Transportation & Comrnxmication 1996 
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Additionally, quoting the information provided by Wang (1994), license permit, 
which restricts the quantity of commodity by type, is required for the inq)ortation of petroleum 
product in Mainland China. To evade this control is one ofthe reasons for smuggling-ia of 
diesel oil to China. 
ii) Reaon for smuggling light diesel oil in to Hong Kong 
Table 3.4.2 : Duty Rate for Light Diesel Oil 
Duty Rate Growth over 
previous year 
Fiscal Year $/Liter % 
„. 1987/88 1 2 0 
1988/89 1.27 5.83 
1989/90 1.37 7.87 
1990/91 1.78 29.93 
1991/92 1.87 5.06 
1992/93 2.06 10.16 
1993/94 2.26 9.71 
1994/95 2.45 8.41 
1995/96 2.65 8.16 
1996/97 2.89 9-06 
Source : Speech by the Financial Secretary , moving the Second Reading of the 
Appropriation Bill，various issue 
Again in 1990/91 Budget Speech, for transport but not for fiscal reason, the 
Financial Secretary proposed to increase the duty rate on hydrocarbon oil by 30%. The rate has 
continuously been increased to keep pace with inflation since the fiscal year 1992/93. The 
increasing duty w i d e n e d t h e differential gap between the retail price of China's diesel oil and 
Hong Kong automobile diesel 0¾ especially after the devaluation of RMB in 1994，referring to 
Table 3.4.3 . The data ofthe price of diesel oil in PRC before 1991 are not available. The motive 
for smuggling-in & out activities can be attributed to this price differential: 
70 
a)Smugglmg-in of Auto-diesel oil 
Auto-diesel oil is smuggled into Hong Kong from China. The figures in Table 
3.4.3 show that the retail price of ADO in Hong Kong in the period from 1991-1994 was at 
least two times ofthat in China. The differential was particularly great in 1994 when RMB was 
significantly devalued. The price of ADO in China dropped and became the lowest among these 
several years. Having discussed with the officers of Customs & Excise Departement, the current 
market price (in Jan-Feb 96 ) of auto diesel oil was reported to be $6.6/liter and the intelligence 
of C & E Department indicated that the auto diesel oil is at $2.5 per liter in China. After the oil 
has been successfully smuggled into Hong Kong，it was sold at $4.0 per liter at the retail level • 
Table3.4.3 : Retail Price of Diesel Oil in Hong Kong & China 
Price of diesel o i l ~ “ Price of ADO Price of IDO Import Price 
Year in China* RMB Rate in Hong Kong in Hong Kong of diesel oil 
— RMB/MetricTon RMB/$10Q HK$/kg ~ HK$/kg HK$/kg 一 HK$/kg 
~ 1 9 9 1 1509.20 68^4""""Z21 " ^ 8 0 2 J 8 1.42 
1 9 9 2 1602.98 71.24 2.25 5.05 2.84 1.27 
1993 2204.98 74.41 2.96 5.30 2.89 1.20 
1994 2327.55 111.52 2.09 5.56 2.96 1.07 
* the average production factor price of 35 cities. Diesel oil is 0# model 
Source • Price in PRChina • Price Yearbook of China ’ various issue 
Price of ADO(Auto-diesel oil) & IDO(Industrial diesel oil),import price _ HK Energy Statistics 
Import price was the average import price of gasoil，diesel oil & naphthe 
Exchange rate - The Almanac of China's Exdiange Economic Relations & Trade 
(b) Smuggling - out of Industrial diesel oil 
Industrial diesel oil is the cheapest oil in the territory and there is no restriction on 
its sale & distribution. However EDO under statutes cannot be used by motor vehicles. Once the 
EDO flows out of the bonded depot，marker and colorate substance have to be added to it. Due 
to tlie price differential, lorry drivers increasingly used the IDO intended for industrial use in their 











































































processing plants to remove the marker and make it look like auto-diesel oil before selling to 
m o t o r vesse l or e?qported to Mainland China. The figure in Table 3.4.3 shows that the retail 
price k Mainland China was also at least two times of Hong Kong's inq)ort price • 
(iii) The consumption trend of EDO & ADO in Hong Kong 
For checking the local consumption tendency of EDO in 1980s & 1990s , Table 
3.4 .4 listed the internal consumption item of I D O re leased from Petroleum Conipaiiies. This is 
used as a proxy for the local consumption. The consumption increased from 638090 kilolitre in 
1981 to 885203 kilolitre in 1990, with an average annual growth rate of 3.7%. The growth from 
1990 to 1993 is 1.89 times. 
Table 3.4.5 : Number of Goods Vehicles (Medium & Heavy ) Licensed by type 
Unit: Number of Vehicles as at the end of year 
Year 1986 | 1989 1991 | 1992 1993 1994 1995 | 
Goods Vehicles 
-Medium 15846 22884 27332 30006 32386 34231 34865 
- Heavy 188 609| 862丨 111s| 1320丨 1587| 1750| 
Source : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics，various issue 
For checking the consumption pattern of ADO in 1980s & 1990s , there is a 
division of the duty paid ADO for buses and other road users (excluding buses). The quantity of 
duty paid ADO for buses decreased significantly since 1992 due to the exemption ofdiesel oil 
duty paid for franchised bus conqjanies, which became effective in the fiscal year 1992/93. For 
the duty paid ADO for other road users, the consun^tion increased from 399758 kilolitres in 
1981 to 615755 kilolitres in 1990 with an average annual growth rate of 4.91%. In addition，the 
average annual growth rate for the peroid from 1990 to 1993 was 5.5%. Unlike pork，the 









































































































































































































































































































































































































diesel oil for different types of vehicles varies by their nature of use. ITiose cross-border 
vehicles with a daily march of hundred miles, say medium & large lorries, followed an increasing 
path in 1990s and the their consumption of duty paid diesel oil should theoretically take the same 
step (re£ to Table 3.4.5) 
For the re-export of IDO，when combining the re-export and local consuii^tion 
oflDO as the total (ref to Table 3.4.6) ? the re-export proportion was in the range of 8 - 14% in 
the late 1980s and 1990s but the same ratio was less than 5% for the years before 1986. 
Additionally, the re-export proportion for ADO for other road -users in Table 3.4.4 was over 
60% in 1990s .The published trade statistics shows that 90% in quantity and value of the re-
exported diesel oflis destined to Mainland China and Macau. IMs is consistent with the increase 
in tke demand of Mainland China as analysed in (i). 
iv) Seizure of diesel oil 
Table 3.4.7 Seizure of IDO & ADO by Marine & Land Enforcement Command's Task 
Seizure of ADO (Unit in Litr^)| 
YEAR 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Duty Paid ADCXA) 704621000 721812000 716689000 700457000 
Seized Volume(B) 93032 78352 151098 285968 
0.0132% 0.0109% 0.0211%) 0.0408% 
Seizure of IDO (Unit in Litres) 
YEAR 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Local UsedIDO(C) 15583840001667088000 W A N / A 
Seized*-
Marked Oil 79280 45239 124592 527870 
Detracted Oil 44010 24000 85240 143102 
Total (D) 1 2 3 2 9 0 “ 6 9 2 3 9 2 0 9 8 3 2 670972 
(D)/(C) 0.0079% 0.0042% 
Source • Seized Figure for 1992 & 1995- Information officer of Custom & Excise Dept 
Seized Figure for 1993 & 1994 -HK Customs & Excise Dept Bulletin 1994 
Note : The exact origin of those seized commodities could not be ascertained 
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a) Auto-diesel oil 
The auto-diesel oil was mainly smuggled into Hong Kong by cross-border 
vehicles and by fishing vessels. Those cross-border vehicles were allowed to have a maximum of 
300 liters of diesel oil in their fuel tanks and the drivers made use of this concession to bring 
diesel oil into Hong Kong for sales. Some drivers would convey Mainland China oil to Hong 
Kong by means of enlarged and modified fuel tank. The Mainland China oil was discharged into 
oil drums and stored at fenced open ground near the border. Finally these dnmis would then be 
conveyed to container yards，carp arks for selling to other vessels. At sea, cargo holds of fishing 
vessels were used to fill up with iuto-diesel oil and smuggled into Hong Kong for subsequent 
sale to operators of illegal refueling station for profit. 
In Nov 1996 , Customs officers seized diesel oil worth HKSlmillion with 
potential duty liability HK$ 430,000. The interesting phenomenon of for this case was the 
vessel，which contained diesel oil having declared to export out of Hong Kong, punned the oil 
through underwater oil tube to another shipyard located nearby. The diesel oil was then finally 
sold to automobiles through the shipyard. (Ming Pao 14/11/96) 
(b)Industrial diesel oil 
For industrial diesel oil (marked oil), marked oil was smuggled from Hong Kong 
t 0 china mainly by fishing vessels. According to information from Customs & Excise 
Department(C & E Dept), there were 9 cases in 1994 in which offenders a t t e s t ed to smuggle 
280,052 liters of marked oil to China and 9 cases (up to Nov. 95) in which offenders were found 
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"exporting or attempting to export ” a total of 558,036 liters of marked oil to China which were 
not covered by a cargo manifest. 
Hong Kong Government has been i^lementing a stiffer punishment for combating 
iUicit Use of diesel oil，especially since January 1997. TTie details are as follows: 
The driver or owner of a vehicle caught using illicit fuel would face a maximum penalty of two 
y e a r s ' i^risonmeiit and a rnmion fine. The culprits would also be fingerprinted and have a 
criminal record. All these measures were introduced by C&E Department and has taken effect 
since 1/1/97. Another measure，already in force before this date, stipulated that a vehicle , if 
foirnd to have used illicit fuel a second time, will be impounded and subject to forfeiture. Hie 
department hoped that the new measures would be a more effective deterrent. (South Cliina 
Morning Post 27.12.96) 
(v) Empirical Analysis 
The diesel oil seizure data in 1980s are not available. In light of believing 
the cause of smuggling is due to the increase in duty of duto-diesel oil and devaluation 
of RMB in 1990. Smuggling-in might be negligible in 1980s. The data are based on the 
monthly figure ofthe petroleum product released from petroleum con^anies published 
in Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics. However, this figure is only available up to 
August 1994. 
a)For Industrial Diesel Oil (Quarterly Analysis) 
LNIDO# 二 2.345 + 0.4504LNGDP# - 0.275 LNPRIDO#- (3.4.1) 
t= (2.570) (2,282) (-1.2153) 
Adjusted R**2 二 0.5797 Durbin-Watson Statistics: 1.922 n=40 
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The correlation for residual: 
8t= 0.6408s t-i + vt 
(4.886) 
LNIDO# = LNIDOt - 0.6408* LNTOOt-i 
LNGDP # 二 LNGDPt - 0.6408*LNGDP t-i 
LNPRIDO# = LNPRIDOr 0.6408 LNPRIDOt-i 
IDO : Ilie quarterly figure of light diesel, industrial use (in cubic meter) released from Petroleum 
companies after excluding ship stores and aircraft stores 
(Source : Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics , various issue) 
PRIDO : Retail Price of IDO 
(Source : Hong Kong Energy Statistics) 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product，At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Q u a r t e r l y Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1995) 
Referring to Equation(3.4.1)，there have been significant auto-correlation for 
t h e residual and AR(1) is used. The t statisatic for variable GDP is significant and 
coefficient is less than 1 which inipHes that industrial diesel oil is income-inelastic 
product. However, the sign for price variable PRIDO is the same as expected but the t 
statisitcs is statistically insignificant. 
For the forecasting exercise, only the GDP variable is used and the equation 
is shown as equation 3.4.2 
LNIDO#= 2.4513 + 0.4504LNGDP# -(3.4,2) 
t 二（2.701) (2.0496) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.57418 Durbin-Watson Statistics二 1.855 n=40 
l i e correlation for residual: 
gt= 0.6457s t.i + vt 
(5.0864) 
LNIDO# = LNIDOt - 0.6457* LNIDOm 
LNGDP # 二 LNGDPt _ 0.6457*LNGDPt-i 
4 The total manufacturing output index has been used as an explanatory variable. Tlie R square is quite low, 
which may be due to the absence of information whidi industry using industrial diesel oil. 
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The discrepancies between the predicted result and published record for 
industrial diesel oil，which are shown in Table 3.4.8 , are all negative for tke sanqjle 
period. Tha t ratio for the 4th. quarter of year 92 and 1st & 2nd quarter of year 93 are 
continuouslly significant in 5% level of confidence. Such, ratio is still signifcant in the 1st 
& 2nd quarter of year 94 at 5% & 10% level of confidence respectively. 
Table 3.4.8 Discrepancies between Published & Predicted Volume of EDO 
== Year f " P r e d - P u b St-error t-ratio 
1991 1st quarter - 0 . 1 0 3 0 . 1 1 5 -0.89 
2nd quarter -0 .130 0 .117 -1.11 
3nd quarter -0 .163 0 .120 -1.35 氺木 
4th quarter -0 .252 0 .118 - 2 . 1 3 * 
1 9 9 2 1st quarter -0 .134 0 .115 -1.16 
. 2nd quarter -0 .359 0 .118 -3.04 氺 
3rd quarter -0 .117 0.121 -0.96 
4th quarter -0 .267 0 .119 -2 .24 木 
1 9 9 3 1st quarter -0 .213 0 .116 -1.84 木 
2nd quarter -0 .313 0 .119 -2 .63 术 
3rd quarter -0 .142 0 .123 -1.16 
4th quarter -0 .064 0 .119 -0.54 
1 9 9 4 1st quarter -0 .188 0 .116 -1.61 林 
[2nd quarter -0.263| 0.119[ -2.20|* 
N o t e . Figure with * -1 ratio was greater than critical value in 5% level of confidaice 
一 Figure with ** -1 ratio was greater than critical value in 10% level of confidoice 
Besides checking the significance of discrepancies, the estimated smuggling 
volume and its percentage when conqjared with the actual petroleum product released 
from petroleum companies are shown in Table3.4.9. Even though the econometric 
exercise is in a quarterly basis, the grouping of four quarters figure into an annual one is 
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used for con^arison. The percentage of smuggling quantity within the sample years 
were approximately 15-20% of the quantity released from petroleum companies 
Table 3.4.9 Estimated Quantities of IDO Smuggling out to China and Its Share (in 
o/o) of the Actual Quantity of Petroleum Product Released 
(Unit in Kilolitre) 
‘ Estimated % of diesel o i l ” ^ 
Year Smuggling Volume released from petroleum Cos 
_ _ 179601 1 5 . 4 8 % ~ ^ — 
1992 308437 19.79% 
1993 281173 16.87% 
1994 462399 16.41% 
Note: * Smuggling quantity was the difference between the predicted quantity based on equation 3.4.2 
and the quantity of petroleum released from pertroleum companies 
Source for the quantity of petroleum released from pertroleum con^anies - Hong Kong 
Monthly Digest of Statistics 
b)For Automobile Diesel Oil (Quarterly Analysis) 
Franchised bus companies received a refirnd of 65 cents a litre on duty paid 
for diesel oil up to fiscal year 92/93. From that year and thereafter, Financial Secretary 
exen^pts the con^anies con^letely from the duty on diesel oil for the purpose of 
combating inflation. Moreover, those bus companies should not engage in smuggling 
activities of diesel oil. There has included the oil used by buses, owned by con^anies 
other than thoses franchised one within the classification of light diesel for buses in the 
published statistics. However, that amount, which is checked in the statistics of 1992, 
was approximately 1% of the light diesel for other road users. Hence, the monthly 
figure of light diesel oil for other road users, which was available in Monthly Digest of 
Statistics up to August 1994, is chosen as independent variable for the regression 
analysis. The result is as follows: 
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LNADO# = 1.840 + 0.652 LNGDP# - 0.00269 LNPRICE# (3.4.3)5 
t = (1.6672) (2.808) (- 0.01005) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.6466 Durbin-Watson Statistics^ 1.829 n=40 
st= 0.5657s t-i +vt 
t = (4.0382) 
LNADO# = I^ADO|-0.5657*I^ADOM 
LNGDP# = LNGDPt - 0.5657* LNGDPt.i 
LNPRICE# = LNPRICEt - 0.5657* LNPRICE t.i 
ADO : The quarterly figure of duty paid light diesel for other road vehicles released from 
Petroleum Companies ( in unit of cubic meter). The quarterly figure is the sum of three 
consecutively monthly figure. 
(Source of Monthly data : Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics) 
PRICE : Retail Price of ADO 
(Source : Hong Kong Energy Statistics) 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product，At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1995) 
For the adjustment of autocorrelation, AR(1) is used for 3.4.3. The equation 
3.4.3 shows that variable PRICE is statistically insignificant and the coefficient is very 
small (less than 0.1)& as e jected, negative in sign. This may not be a surprise since the 
engines of vehicles, say lorries & taxies，are specially designed for the fuel of diesel oil 
and there is no substitute available. For the variable GDP , its coefficient is less than 
unity which in^lies that auto-diesel oil, the same as industrial diesel oil, is income in-
elastic commodity. For forecasting exercise, only the variable GDP is chosen and the 
result is as follows : 
LNADO# = 1.847 + 0.6513 LNGDP# (3.4.4) 
t = (L866) (3.332) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.6563 Durbin-Watson Statistics: 1.829 n=40 
5 GDP is chosen as explanatroy variable instead of the number of motor vehicle. This is because the exact distance 
traveled by each vehicle is not the same. 
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8t= 0.5651s t-i+Vt 
t=(4.148) 
LNADO# = LNADOt - 0.565l*LNADOt-i 
LNGDP# = LNGDPr 0.5651* LNGDPt-i 
The discrepancies between the predicted result and published record for 
automobile diesel oil, which is shown in Table 3.4.10, are all insignificant for the 
san^le period except the 4tk quarter of 1993. That exception is due to the published 
figure in Oct 93 being significantly lower than that of the same year. Since the quarterly 
result is not satisactory, an annual analysis is shown in equation 3.4.5. 
Table3.4.10 Discrepancies Between Published & Predicted Volume of ADO 
Year — Pred- Pub St-error t-ratio 
T^I 1st quarter O070 oTl7 ^598 
2nd quarter -0.071 0.119 -0.595 
^ 3rd quarter -0.050 0.123 -0.408 
4th quarter 0.024 0.121 0.199 
1992 1st quarter 0.025 0.118 0.211 
2nd quarter -0.061 0.121 -0.505 
3rd quarter -0.037 0.126 -0.297 
4th quarter 0.034 0.122 0.279 
1993 1st quarter 0.033 0.118 0.277 
2nd quarter -0.059 0.122 -0.482 
3rd quarter -0.027 0.128 -0.209 
4th quarter 0.254 0.124 2.051 
1994 1st quarter -0.053 0.119 -0.446 
2nd quarter -0.062 0.123 -0.50l| 
C)For Automobile Diesel Oil (Annual Analysis) 
Even though the data for the auto-mobile diesel oil is only available up to 
August 1994, the annual figure of duty paid dsiesel oil of road vehicles from Customs 
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& Excise Department is chosen as dependent variable based on the equation as in 
(3.4.4). The result is : 
LNADOPAIDT 二 10.216 + 0 .7581 LNGDPT (3 .4 .5) 
(25.032) (24.052) 
Adjusted R**2 = 0.9846 Durbin-Watson Statistics: 1.719 n=l l 
ADOPAID ： Annual figure ofthe duty paid diesel oil for road vdiicles(in unit of litre) 
(Source : Statistics Division of Customs & Excise Dqjartmoit) 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product，At 1990 Price Level 
(Source : Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1961-1995) 
Table3.4.11 Discrepancies between Published & Predicted Volume of ADO 
(Annual Analysis) 
. Year Pred- Pub~ St-error t-ratio 
1991 -0.002 0.030 -0.06 
1 9 9 2 - 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 3 1 - 0 . 3 2 
1 9 9 3 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 3 5 
1 9 9 4 0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 3 3 1 . 7 8 TT 
1995 0.115 0.033丨 3.44丨* 
Note : Figure with * -1 ratio was greater than critical value in 5% level of confidence 
Figure with ** _ t ratio was greater than critical value in 10% level of confidence 
The t ratio for the annual discrepancies of automobile diesel oil in Table 
3.4.11 is insignificant for the first 3 sanq)le years, whicli is the same as the result of 
quarterly analysis. However, it shows a tendency that the predicted figure is on the high 
side in 1993 and gradually widened in 1994 & 1995. 
Besides checking the significance of discrepancies, the estimated smuggling 
volume and its percentage when compared with the quantity of duty paid auto-diesel 
oil provided by Customs & Excise Department is shown in Table 3.4.12. The 
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percentage of smuggling quantity for the year 1994 &95, with significant 
discrepancies，was approximately 6-12% of the duty paid auto-diesel oil 
Table 3.4.12 Estimated ADO Smuggling Quantities (unit in litre)and Tax Evaded 
一 Estimated % of duty Duty Rate# Tax Evaded 
Year Smuggling Quantity paid diesel oil HK$/Litre (HK$QOO) 
1 9 9 1 - 1 1 7 3 9 2 1 - 0 . 1 8 % 1 8 5 N i l — 
1992 -6944206 -0.99% 2.01 Nil 
1993 � 8060097 1.12% 2.21 17813 
1994 42879003 5.98% 2.40 103017 
1 9 9 5 85300614 12.18% Z60 221782 
# _ The duty rate announed by HK Government was in fiscal year basis. Econometric 
exercise was for the calendar year. Hoice，the duty rate was calculated on a weighted 
average basis = 0.25* Duty rate of last fiscal year + 0.75* Duty rate of current fiscal 
year 
Note: * Smuggling quantity is the difference between the predicted quantity based on equation 3.4.5 
and the duty paid auto-diesel oil 
Source for the duty paid auto-diesel oil-Customs and Excise Department 
When taking the enqjirical result of botli industrial and auto-diesel oil 
together, a preliminary picture of diesel oil smuggling is drawn. The 29.93 % increase 
in duty rate of auto-mobile diesel oil in fiscal year 1990/91 and the further increase of 
5.06 % & 10.16% in 1991/92 and 92/93 respectively led to substantial price increase of 
duty inclusive ADO in Hong Kong. As the consumption of diesel oil is growth driven， 
which is proxied by GDP growth, the GDP effect is statistically significant . However， 
the price effect on consimq)tion was insignificant due to no alternative substitute for the 
specially designed engine. This brought the incentive for the lorry driver to use 
industrial use IDO in their vehicles. In order to avoid the detection , some syndicates 
set up processing plant to remove the marker from marked diesel oil. This was the 
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reason for significant negative discrepancies for the years after 1992 of IDO and the 
reversed direction of discrepancies of ADO after 1993. 
Additionally, the devaluation ofRMB in 1994 has further widened the price 
differential and attracted the lorry driver to smuggle auto-diesel oil from the mainland 
China. It brought the significant positive discrepancies for the years after 1994. 
85 
Chapter 4 Conclusion 
Hong Kong, as other free ports of the world, is favoured by the smugglers 
to engage in the illegal activities. The close geographical proximity of Hong Kong 
Sc China provides a less risky route for smugglers. The cost of smuggling is also 
reduced, underpinned by the increased economic and social integration between the 
territories and China's coastal cities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the smuggling-
out activities from Hong Kong to China increased in the late 1980s, which was in 
line with the success of economic reform launched after 1978. Hong-Kong 
Government was forced to face the smuggling problem in 1990 summer due to the 
symbol of the death of police officer and the increase in the number of stealing 
vehicles cases. The trade partner statistics show that there have been significant 
discrepancies for consumer goods between Japan exports and China iirq)orts for the 
sample period 1993-95. 
In contrast, the smuggling-in activities from Mainland China to Hong 
Kong, which seldom occured in the last decade, soared significantly in the early 
1990s. The increase in duty, say cigarette and diesel oil，is one of the reasons for 
those serious smuggling activities. Chapter 3 shows that the year with the most 
serious smuggling activities for tobacco and diesel oil are 1993 and 1995 
respectively. The tobacco duty evaded in 1993 was roughly estimated to be 
HK$485million and the diesel oil duty evaded in 1995 was HK$222million. 
Moreover, the smuggling-in of pork (including both slaughtered and frozen) was 
also serious in the 1990s. The smuggled quantity of fresh slaughtered pork was 
estimated to be approximately 5.01% of the number ofswines slaughtered in 
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abattoir in 1993 , which was the year with significant statistical discrepancies for 
both slaughtered and frozen pork. Regarding the smuggling volume of frozen pork 
in 1993，it was estimated to be approximately 44% of the published retained 
import statistics of this commodity. 
Even though the Hong Kong Government has paid much effort to amend 
the law and other measures to tackle the smuggling problem , the problem still 
existed due to the sustained demand of illegal imported commodity of the different 
interest-groups in the mainland China. The following discussion would try to 
assess the smuggling activities between Hong Kong & the mainland China in the 
near future. 
(a)For Smuggling into Hong Kong from China 
The linkages between Hong Kong and Mainland China have no doubt been 
strengthening rapidly, especially after the resun^tion of sovereignty of Mainland 
China in 1997. The cost of smuggling would be further reduced. Additionally, the 
Mainland China Government has successfully controlled the inflation rate since 
1996，even though nobody is sure how long it will last. The reduced price level 
would provide further incentive to engage in smuggling activities. 
The Hong Kong Government should learn the experience in raising the 
duty rate of cigarette. Hong Kong is close to Mainland China whicli supplies 
abundant dutiable commodities. As stated in Chapter 3，the cost of smuggling has 
been greatly reduced since the last decade. Raisng the tariff rate may result in the 
increase of cross-border illegal activities without achieving the anti-smoking 
objective. 
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(b) For smuggling-out from Hong Kong to China 
Before 1994, there existed two trade hurdles for an inq)orter in China: 
trade approval and foreign exchange rationing • The 1994 foreign exchange reform 
theoretically removed the latter restriction. However, Tsang (1997) argued that the 
foreign exchange control regime was closely related to the trade control system. It 
means little for a country to "achieve" current account convertibility if significant 
trade restrictions in the form of licensing , quotas and registration requirements still 
persist or very high tariffs are irqposed on in^orts. 
With effect from 1 April 1996, the Chinese authorities announced that 
the import duties of more than 4,000 of the 6,000-plus tariff categories were 
lowered and the overall in^ort tariff rate reduced from an average 35.9% to 23%. 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin announced that the Chinese govememnt would 
reduce the average tariff rate to the level of 15% by the year 2000. 
As summarized by the Trade Development Council (March 1996)，there 
were some principles for differentiating the reduction of tariff rate. Raw materials 
and equipment generally enjoyed larger tariff cuts than manufactured goods. The 
tariffs of television parts were slashed by 30% verns 23% of that of con^lete 
television sets. Those industries in which China enjoyed conqjetitive edge were 
with cuts in 40%-50%., say garment industries. Imports of high and new-tech 
products were encouraged by means of tariff rate generally below 10%. 
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Table 4.1 China's New Tariff Rates on Selected Consumer Goods 
(Effective from 1 April 1996) 
[" Commodity Iold preferaitial rate Inew preferaitial rate Change 
(NEW/OLD) 
Record Players ^0% ^ 
Cass^te tape recorders 90% 60% -33% 
Video Camera 85% 60% -29% 
Colour television sets 60% 50% -11% 
Sedan cars U0% 100% "9 % 
Light passenger cars 110% 雇 ％ "9 % 
|Motorcycles 120% | 70% -42% 
Source : Abstracted from Trade Development Council ( April 96) 
Table 4.1 listed the change of tariff rate for those consumer items 
preferred by smugglers stated in Chapter 2. The rate for electrical appliance has 
been reduced approximately 30%, except 17% for color television set. In contrast, 
the decrease of duty rate for sedan cars and light passage cars was just 9% but the 
rate for motorcycle was the highest among all. 
However, importation of high and new technologies and equipment being 
for underdeveloped sectors was encouraged by low tariff rate generally below 10% 
and 15% respectively. For instance, integrated circuit was given a 60% slash in 
tariff and microelectronics parts and nuclear reactor parts over 60%. On the 
other hand, though the tariff rate for consumer goods has reduce since 1 April 96, 
the rate is only con^paratively lowered and it is still at a "high, leveL Potential for 
smuggling still exist. 
According to current regulations, foreign-invested enterprises producing 
goods in China and selling them in the domestic market are required to pay inq)ort 
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tarifis and other import taxes. Theoretically, the current round of tariff reductions 
would cause the foreign -invested manufacturers to increase their domestic sales 
ratio. However, for those products with relatively smaller reduction in tariff，the 
abovementioned effect is expected to be limited. 
Some would argue that, for the membership of WTO, the trade barriers 
would finally be wholly eliminated and then there would be no further incentive for 
smuggling activities. However, the full elimination of this visible trade barrier 
cannot be completed in a tcbig bang ” manner due to the consideration of industrial 
policy and the protection of nascent industries. As argued by Fung & Lau (1997b), 
China insisted to join WTO as a developing country and had a transition period to 
meet the relevant requirement of WTO gradually. Fung believed that these two 
were related since a developing country status would allow China a longer 
transition period to bring tariffs in line with other WTO members. Within that 
period, the technological inq>ort and raw material must be put at the top of 
import priority list for the development perspective and the tariff cuts would be 
bigger. Hence, the smuggling of luxury consumer goods at the end of list is 
believed to be inevitable. 
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